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Through their use of resources, their investments and their output, corporations
have a significant impact on our natural environment. In that regard, the long term
sustainability of the current business model is currently attracting widespread attention.
However, corporations have access to several environmental management tools at both
the technical and managerial levels. The challenge is to integrate and implement these
tools in their business activities to improve corporate environmental performance.
Among these tools, accounting plays a critical role in the environmental management of
organizations as it directly relates to the measurement and disclosure of corporate
environmental performance.
The purpose of this dissertation, which comprises three essays, is to study the role
of stakeholders in the environmental accounting-related issues of environmental
investment, performance measurement and disclosure. The first essay focuses on
environmental resource allocation decisions and specifically examines the influence of
corporate governance over the intensity of environmental capital expenditures. Results
show that governance mechanisms dedicated to stakeholder accountability and
environmental protection increase the intensity of environmental capital expenditures.
The second essay concentrates on environmental performance measurement by
investigating the role played by stakeholders in the selection of internal environmental
performance indicators. Results suggests that stakeholder influences over internal
iii
environmental performance metrics are organized along a continuum ranging from
narrow unidirectional influence to broad interactive influence necessitating
environmental benchmarking. The last essay shifts the attention toward voluntary
environmental reporting. More specifically, I contrast corporate and non-corporate
(stakeholder) environmental disclosure, focusing on a single organization and its critical
stakeholders. Results from the analysis of these environmental reporting dynamics show
that different disclosure patterns arise among the perspectives, ranging from uniformity to
performance-neutral and performance-biased gaps between the case firm's and
stakeholders' disclosures. Overall, these results lead to the conclusion that stakeholders
influence environmental accounting, but the form and extent of their influence depends
upon the nature of the stakeholder group and the environmental issue at stake. As a
whole, by bringing nuances into the portrayal of stakeholder influences, the dissertation
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The thesis comprises three distinct essays. The second essay, entitled "Stakeholders'
influence over the choice of internal environmental performance indicators", is being
developed into a co-authored paper with Professors Emilio Boulianne and Michel
Magnan. I provided the initial intellectual impetus to launch the research project. I
performed most of data collection and analysis and wrote the first drafts of the paper.
Professors Boulianne and Magnan contributed additional expertises in the areas of
environmental disclosure and management control research. The ultimate outcome is a
joint effort with all three coauthors contributing to writing and developing the paper.
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Introduction
The worrying context of climate change (see Worldwatch 2009) has called the
environmental impacts of all social actors into question. Solutions must be found and
implemented by all actors for the planet to survive. Among the social actors, businesses
generate significant amounts of pollution and other environmental impacts that are not
sustainable in the long term. Environmental tools at both the technical and managerial
levels of corporations must be integrated in business activities to improve corporate
environmental performance. As such a tool, accounting can contribute to the
environmental management of organizations. Indeed,
"(j)ust as conventional management and financial
accounting has been a powerful tool in the management,
planning, control and accountability of the economic
aspects of an organization, broader techniques of
sustainability accounting and accountability have the
potential to be powerful tools in the management, planning,
control and accountability for organizations of their social
and environmental impacts" (Unerman et al. 2007:3).
In this respect, the dissertation examines several environmental accounting issues from a
stakeholder perspective. The three interrelated essays in the dissertation examine the
following accounting issues: (1) budgeting (e.g. Fisher et al. 2002; Hansen et al. 2003) in
the form of investments in environmental capital expenditures (2) strategic performance
measurement systems (e.g. Hoque and James 2000; Ittner et al. 2003), in the form of
internal environmental performance indicators, and (3) voluntary external reporting (e.g.
Gibbins et al. 1990; Healy and Palepu 2001), in the form of corporate environmental
disclosure. These three issues cover related environmental matters. Investment in
environmental capital expenditures dedicated to pollution control and abatement (essay 1)
necessitates environmental performance monitoring (essay 2) to ensure that the expected
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improvements in performance are accomplished. Results from this monitoring process
can then be voluntarily externally reported to stakeholders concerned with environmental
issues (essay 3). As a whole, the dissertation ranges from internal environmental
decision-making to external reporting on environmental activities and performance. It
adopts a stakeholder perspective to acknowledge and emphasize that underlying any
attempt at social (including environmental) accounting there are (internal or external)
stakeholder recipient(s) to whom the environmental account is addressed (Gray et al.
1997). Specifically, the three essays respectively focus on the following research
questions:
1) To what extent do governance mechanisms affect the intensity of environmental
capital expenditures investments?
2) How do stakeholders influence firms in the selection of internal environmental
performance indicators?
3) How different are corporate and non-corporate external environmental
disclosures?
Each essay will now be briefly introduced.
With its focus on the intensity of capital expenditures, the first essay is part of the
budgeting literature (see Covaleski et al. 2003 for a review). This literature covers both
the amount of resources allocated to a specific purpose and the process of elaborating and
using budgets (Covaleski et al. 2003). The first essay extends this substream by studying
the drivers of capital expenditures allocation decisions. In particular, the essay examines
the role played by corporate governance in the intensity of environmental capital
2
expenditures. Stakeholder- and ethics-based arguments on corporate governance
hypothesize that better environmentally governed firms invest more in environmental
capital expenditures. This argument is analyzed with the help of a regression model
testing the relationship between the intensity of environmental capital expenditures and
board characteristics related to environmental management (e.g. the presence of an
environmental committee on the board) on a sample of 197 firm-year observations from
companies in the S&P 500, operating in environmentally sensitive industries. Figure 1
depicts the relationship analyzed in the first essay.





Within the accounting literature, internal environmental performance indicators are
included in strategic performance measurement systems. A strategic performance
measurement system is a type of management accounting system that features a set of
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performance measures designed to align managers' actions with the strategy of the
organization (Atkinson et al. 1997; Webb 2004). This system contains multiple
performance measures, including internal environmental performance indicators. The
objective of the second essay is to study strategic performance measurement systems
through the stakeholder lens by investigating the role stakeholders play in the selection of
internal environmental performance indicators. The essay adopts a qualitative field
research methodology that relies on complementary information sources; interviews with
managers and a review of corporate documents and policies. The field setting is a large
multinational organization that is active in an environmentally sensitive sector with
operations on all continents. Interviews were conducted with key environmental
management executives from the firm's worldwide headquarters. Both stakeholder theory
and legitimacy theory are drawn upon to structure and integrate the interpretation of
managers' responses and corporate documents. Figure 2 provides an overview of the
relationship studied in the second essay.
Figure 2: The relationship studied in the second essay 'Stakeholders' influence over the choice of
internal environmental performance indicators'
>
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The third essay falls within the scope of voluntary disclosure research. Voluntary
environmental accounting disclosure is part of the broad stream of accounting research
analyzing all sorts of voluntary disclosure (see Healy and Palepu 2001; Berthelot et al.
2003 for reviews). This stream of literature examines the determinants (e.g. Botosan and
Harris 2000; Clarkson et al. 1994; Cormier and Magnan 2003) and consequences (e.g.
Leuz and Verrecchia 2000; Richardson and Welker 2001) associated with the voluntary
disclosure of accounting information. The third essay covers both the determinants and
consequences of corporate voluntary environmental disclosure by analyzing the
informational dynamics of environmental management. These dynamics refer to the way
constituents (the firm and its stakeholders) release environmental information, react to the
releases from other constituents and affect each other in their disclosures (adapted from
Buhr 2007). The analysis is accomplished through a longitudinal case study contrasting
environmental information reported by the case firm with environmental information
about the firm disclosed by four stakeholder groups or their representatives, namely
governments, community, environmental non-governmental organizations and investors.
The case firm selected for this study is a large international corporation operating in the
forest and paper products industry throughout North America and the United Kingdom.
The differences between corporate and stakeholder environmental values underlined by
the conceptual framework of ethical relativism are employed to interpret the patterns
found in the informational dynamics. Figure 3 illustrates the relationship investigated in
the third essay.
5
Figure 3: The relationship studied in the third essay: 'Contrasting realities: Corporate environmental
disclosure and stakeholder-released environmental information '
\
)
Taken as a whole, the dissertation provides related insights into stakeholders' concern for
and impact on accounting information. The first essay examines how stakeholder- and
ethics-driven governance affects the accounting decisions concerning environmental
capital expenditures resource allocation. The second essay presents stakeholder
influences on the management accounting issue of environmental performance
measurement. The third essay provides evidence of stakeholder actions and impacts
regarding the financial accounting issue of voluntary environmental reporting. Overall,
the dissertation contributes to accounting knowledge by presenting a nuanced portrayal of
stakeholder influence on environmental accounting issues. It shows that different forms
and degrees of influence arise for different issues. This knowledge is extremely
important in the environmental context of the climate change affecting the planet. In
Canada today, one of the most important pieces of information needed by organizations
to properly address sustainability issues is how to adapt business strategy to climate
change (RNSB 2008). The guidance on firm-stakeholder interaction for environmental
investment, performance measurement and disclosure that is provided by this dissertation
is a valuable resource for corporations. It will potentially help organizations move
towards greater accountability and/or sustainability with respect to environmental
performance.
The dissertation is organized as follows. The first three chapters present each doctoral
essay. The fourth chapter adopts an integrative perspective to discuss the dissertation as a
whole. A conclusion follows, which includes a summary, limitations and avenues of
future research.
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Chapter l: The impact of governance on
ENVIRONMENTAL CAPITAL EXPENDITURES
Abstract
This paper combines the governance and the environmental accounting literature to
explore the impact of corporate governance on environmental budgeting decisions.
Specifically, a pooled cross-sectional sample of firms from environmentally sensitive
industries is employed to investigate the relationship between the intensity of
environmental capital expenditures and board characteristics related to environmental
performance management. Results provide support for the stakeholder- and ethics-based
argument that the presence of environmental governance mechanisms at the board level
leads corporations to invest more in environmental capital expenditures. Complementary
analyses show that the influence of environmental governance over environmental capital
expenditures is broader for firms with an environmental board committee than for firms
functioning without such a committee. However, this influence is more limited for firms
pursuing a reactive rather than a proactive environmental strategy. These results suggest
that environmental governance is intended to improve environmental protection rather
than to greenwash. By providing exploratory evidence on the role of the board with
respect to environmental investment, this study innovates by demonstrating that corporate
governance exerts an influence beyond the realm of conventional financial activities. The
paper thus begins answering the call for research on the relationship between
environmental accounting and governance.
8
1.1. Introduction
Corporate social responsibility is increasingly considered part of the scope of corporate
governance (Conference Board of Canada 2008; SustainAbility 2001; 2008; Milnes
2009). To manage the social and environmental responsibilities faced by corporations,
diverse voluntary governance mechanisms are implemented at the board and the top
management levels. For instance, some boards delegate the management of social
responsibilities to a committee. Exxon Mobil has such a committee and formulates its
mission as follows: "This (Public Issues and Contributions) Committee reviews the
effectiveness of the Corporation's policies, programs, and practices with respect to safety,
health, the environment, and social issues. The Committee hears reports from operating
units on safety and environmental activities, and also visits operating sites to observe and
comment on current operating practices" (Exxon Mobil proxy statement April 16, 2009,
p. 10). Other boards recruit directors with environmental expertise. For example, both
Alcoa and Du Pont had former World Wildlife Fund1 executives on their boards in 2009
(Alcoa proxy statement March 16, 2009; Du Pont proxy statement March 20, 2009). Still
other boards incorporate environmental incentives in their executive compensation
scheme (see U.S. Steel proxy statement of March 1 3, 2009 for an example).
While voluntary environmental governance activities are rapidly evolving, controversy
around voluntary environmental initiatives is found in the academic accounting literature.
Some researchers argue that greater environmental disclosure is used to cover poor
environmental performance (e.g. Hughes et al. 2001; Patten 2002) whereas others
WWF is an environmental non-governmental organization whose mission is "to stop the degradation of
the planet's natural environment and to build a future in which humans live in harmony with nature"
(WWF 2009).
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maintain the opposite, i.e. that superior environmental disclosure demonstrates better
environmental performance (e.g. Al-Tuwaijri et al. 2004; Clarkson et al. 2008). In the
midst of this controversy, the current context of climate change and pollution of our
planet (see Worldwatch 2009) underlines the necessity to differentiate greenwashing
activities2 from sound environmental initiatives in order to foster organizational change
towards sustainable development (see Birkin et al. 2005; Adams and McNicholas 2007;
Bebbington 2007), specifically by curbing greenwashing while enhancing environmental
protection. Environmental governance has not been broadly studied in this respect,
although the motives behind this function certainly deserve attention. At the very least,
the implementation of environment-related governance mechanisms on boards may
signal a concern for the environment. Is this concern translated into tangible pro-
environment actions? This question is the starting point of this paper, which broadly aims
to study the environmental consequences of environmental governance.
More specifically, the paper investigates the impact of environmental governance
mechanisms on the intensity of environmental capital expenditures. Environmental
capital expenditures (hereafter ECE) are capital expenditures dedicated to pollution
control and abatement. From an accounting perspective, ECE provide future incremental
economic benefits related to competitive advantages (Clarkson et al. 2004) and are part of
the capital expenditure budgeting process. ECE are also important from regulatory,
strategic and financial perspectives. From a regulatory standpoint, current and future
environmental laws require corporations to invest in diverse equipment for compliance
2 Greenwashing refers to the process by which corporations attempt to shape their image through the
announcement of environmental actions and/or the mention of environmental concerns in their
communications for the purpose to appear environmentally responsible (Laufer 2003).
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purposes (Johnston 2005). As such, environmental regulators regard current and future
ECE as key elements of environmental performance compliance. In addition, ECE and
projected ECE are specifically targeted by the Securities and Exchange Commission
(Johnson 1 993; SEC 2008). The financial regulator therefore considers information on
environmental capital spending of significant importance to the overall financial portrayal
of corporations. From a strategic standpoint, for the environmental strategy to create
organizational value, it has to rely on valuable resources (Hart 1995). ECE are some of
those valuable resources that, by definition, contribute to the improvement of
environmental performance. They are thus strategically important (Buysse and Verbeke
2003). From a financial standpoint, the contribution of ECE in the improvement of
environmental performance is recognized by investors, who confer value-relevance to
ECE in certain situations (Clarkson et al. 2004; Johnston 2005). In addition, as ECE
represent potential means by which corporations can reduce their greenhouse gas
emissions, they also have market significance from the carbon-trading financial
perspective (Johnston et al. 2008). In brief, given the accounting, regulatory, strategic
and financial significance of ECE and the purported environmental dedication of certain
governance mechanisms, this paper investigates whether environmental governance
mechanisms can trigger greater environment-related investments.
Governance is traditionally defined as "the set of mechanisms that influence the decisions
made by managers when there is a separation of ownership and control" (Larcker et al.
2007: 964). It aims to ensure the optimal allocation and utilization of resources and the
protection of shareholders' interests (Bushman and Smith 2001). In the social accounting
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literature, the definition of corporate governance is broadened to take into account
directors' duties towards stakeholders (Haniffa and Cooke 2005; Sacconi 2006; Milnes
2009). Corporate governance refers to "the system of checks and balances (...) which
ensures that companies discharge their accountability to all their stakeholders and act in a
socially responsible way in all areas of their business activity" (Solomon 2007: 14). In
line with this second definition of corporate governance, the conceptual framework of the
paper adopts a stakeholder and ethical perspective on governance. It attributes to
directors economic, ethical and social (including environmental) responsibilities towards
stakeholders for which accountability must be discharged (Brennan and Solomon 2008;
Collier 2008; Rossouw 2005). As such, directors need to institute mechanisms that will
ensure that established ethical standards are followed throughout their organization
(Rossouw 2005). Further, directors consider environmental compliance one of the most
important stakeholder expectations (Wang and Dewhirst 1992). This entails that
corporate governance is an important determinant of environmental performance
(Johnson and Greening 1999; Kassinis and Vafeas 2002; Lam and Li 2007). Accordingly,
corporate governance can be deemed to influence ECE decisions because ECE are, by
definition, related to environmental performance improvement. Taken as a whole, this
conceptual framework proposes that firms that have implemented environmental
governance mechanisms will undertake more intensive ECE investments. The intensity of
ECE investments is defined as the proportion of capital expenditures dedicated to
pollution abatement and control for a given year.
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I explore this proposition by regressing the intensity of ECE on three environmental
governance mechanisms and several environmental and financial control variables. The
environmental governance mechanisms examined are (1) the presence of an
environmental committee on the board; (2) the proportion of external board members
having specific environmental knowledge; and (3) the presence of environmental
incentives in executive compensation. These mechanisms are derived from the financial
governance literature, in which similar mechanisms were found to be relevant to financial
decisions and outcomes (see Cohen et al. 2004 for a review). The study's sample consists
of firms included in the S&P500, operating in the lOxx to the 39xx industry SIC code
(environmentally sensitive industries) and disclosing ECE information in their 10-Ks.
The final sample comprises 197 firm-year observations that were collected from years
2003 to 2007.
Results provide support for the argument that the presence of environmental governance
mechanisms at the board level leads corporations to invest more in ECE. The influence
of environmental governance is broader for firms with an environmental board committee
than for firms functioning without such a committee. However, the influence is more
limited for firms pursuing a reactive rather than a proactive environmental strategy.
These results imply that environmental governance is intended to improve environmental
protection rather than to greenwash.
By providing exploratory evidence of the effectiveness of environmental governance on
environmental investment, this paper answers the call for more research on the
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relationships between environmental accounting and governance (Berthelot et al. 2003).
Specifically, it extends two accounting streams of literature: the social and environmental
stream and the governance stream. Indeed, social accounting research has concentrated
on the impact of general governance mechanisms on social disclosure (Haniffa and
Cooke 2005; Van der Laan Smith et al. 2005; Aerts et al. 2007; Cormier et al. 2009). In
addition, to date, most governance research has focused on the factors inherent in the
monitoring of financial activities, such as audit committee characteristics, board
composition and ownership structure (Bushman and Smith 2001; Cohen et al. 2004);
environmental governance mechanisms have been neglected (Kassinis and Vafeas 2002;
Brennan and Solomon 2008; Berrone and Gomez-Mejia 2009). The paper innovates by
studying multiple environmental governance mechanisms in an environmental budgeting
decision.
The paper also has practical and policy implications. In the current context of
burgeoning environmental governance, the paper offers evidence relevant to directors,
regulators and stakeholders. Indeed, the results will provide guidance to boards
concerned with environmental issues on mechanisms to improve environmental
performance. This is especially important because the environmental governance
movement, which is mainly driven by practitioners and environmental non-governmental
organizations (ref: Conference Board of Canada 2008; SustainAbility 2001; 2008), has
been the subject of little scientific research. Results will also be useful to regulators and
standard setters reflecting on the best ways to shape policies in order to stimulate wider
corporate care for the environment. For instance, such reflection took place at the World
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Economie Forum of Davos (Elkington 2006). Finally, although they are well-developed
theoretically, stakeholder engagement and dialogue practices have yet to be broadly
employed (Unerman and Bennett 2004; Thomson and Bebbington 2005; O'Dwyer et al.
2005a; Unerman 2007). Before these practices reach a satisfactory level of
implementation, stakeholders looking for means to assess the impact of environmental
governance for a given corporation may rely on the results of this study.
The paper is organized as follows. The relevant literature is introduced in the second
section, along with the conceptual framework and related hypothesis development. The
methodological approach is described in the third section while the fourth section
presents the results. The last section summarizes the findings and identifies limitations
and future research opportunities.
1.2. Background literature and hypothesis development
1.2.1. Environmental capital expenditures
This section summarizes the literature on ECE. The first set of studies focuses on
different aspects of ECE disclosure. Cho and Patten (2008) observe the level of ECE
disclosure over a ten-year period. They conclude that the breadth and depth of disclosure
on the subject is limited and not improving, although the materiality of ECE increases
over time. Patten (2005) examines the reliability of projected future ECE by comparing
financial report projections with actual spending. He finds that most of the time,
projected ECE are overestimated, i.e. that actual environmental investments are lower
than previously projected. He concludes that these disclosures "project an image of
impending action on environmental matters that is not carried out in reality" (462).
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Similarly, Cho et al. (2009) argue that ECE are disclosed not to signal improved future
environmental performance, but rather to legitimize poor past environmental performance
in the eyes of stakeholders.
A second stream of literature concentrates on the value associated with ECE investment.
Clarkson et al. (2004) study the value relevance of ECE conditioned on environmental
performance. Their results show that only ECE from low-polluting firms are valued by
the market. In other words, the market does not consider that ECE by high-polluting
firms generate value for these corporations. Johnston (2005) extends this first study by
examining the value-relevance of voluntary and regulatory ECE in terms of abnormal
earnings, stock prices and stock returns. Johnston argues that regulatory ECE are
investments incurred to comply with environmental laws while voluntary ECE
demonstrate an environmental commitment exceeding compliance. He shows that
regulatory ECE are negatively associated with all relevance measures, whereas voluntary
ECE are not significantly relevant to any measure.
In summary, ECE research demonstrates that ECE disclosure is associated with low
levels of environmental performance, in line with the finding that the relevance of actual
ECE depends on environmental commitment. However, to the best of my knowledge, the
drivers of ECE investments have not been investigated until now. I suggest that
environmental governance represents some of these drivers. Thus I add to the ECE
accounting literature by examining the influence of governance on ECE spending. The
16
conceptual relationship between environmental governance and environmental
investments is described in the following section.
1.2.2. Governance
The management and finance literature attributes three strategic functions to the board of
directors: (1) the advice function, whereby board members shape and evaluate strategic
decisions; (2); the monitoring function, in which they protect shareholders' interests by
monitoring managers' behavior; (3) and the resource-dependence function, through
which they facilitate access to the resources and legitimacy crucial for corporate success
(Johnson et al. 1996; Zahra and Pearce 1989; Fama and Jensen 1983). Both the advice
and the monitoring functions of the board can affect ECE intensity. This argument is
developed below using studies on the influence of corporate governance on (1)
environmental management and (2) on investment decisions.
1.2.2.1. The role ofgovernance in environmental performance management
The firm's strategy is shaped and evaluated through the advice function of the board
(Zahra and Pearce 1989). To understand this function with respect to environmental
management, it is necessary to extend the definition of corporate governance beyond the
realm of the mechanisms solely concerned with protection of and accountability to
shareholders (see Bushman and Smith 2001; Cohen et al. 2004 for reviews). Indeed, both
research and practice suggest the emergence of a broader definition of corporate
governance encompassing a wide range of stakeholders (KoIk 2008; Brennan and
Solomon 2008), with directors' fiduciary duty encompasses responsibilities towards
stakeholders and the environment (Sacconi 2006; Milnes 2009). Specifically, this
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definition of corporate governance attributes to directors economic, ethical and social
(including environmental) responsibilities for which accountability must be discharged
(Brennan and Solomon 2008; Collier 2008; Rossouw 2005). As a result, the economic,
social and environmental performance of a corporation depends on the type of corporate
governance adopted (Elkington 2006). This section describes the ethical and social
(environmental) responsibilities of the board. The economic responsibilities of the board
are discussed in the next section.
From a stakeholder perspective, stakeholder accountability and organizational
responsibility are issues of corporate governance (Bhimani and Soonawalla 2005; Haniffa
and Cooke 2005; Sacconi 2006). In other words, "corporate governance requires firms to
take responsibilities for their impacts on societies and on their stakeholders" (Rossouw
2005: 33). Indeed, directors consider themselves responsible towards multiple
stakeholders and are aware of stakeholders' needs and expectations (Wang and Dewhirst
1992). Environmental performance represents an important expectation for stakeholders,
including shareholders (Henriques and Sadorsky 1999; Buysse and Verbeke 2003; Tilt
2007; Thomas et al. 2007). This is acknowledged by directors who consider
environmental compliance one of the most important stakeholder expectations (Wang and
Dewhirst 1992). Following this line of thought, governance practices designed to respond
to stakeholder environmental expectations should increase the intensity of environmental
activities such as ECE.
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From an ethical perspective, directors are responsible for the ethical performance of their
firm (Schwartz et al. 2005; Ibrahim et al. 2003). They need to institute mechanisms that
will ensure that established ethical standards are followed throughout their organization
(Rossouw 2005). Environmental protection is one of the ethical issues under directors'
responsibility (Schwartz et al. 2005).3 As such, the oversight of ECE by the board can be
motivated by directors' ethical responsibilities. Indeed, corporate governance is an
important determinant of environmental performance (Johnson and Greening 1999; Lam
and Li 2007). More specifically, boards of directors are key actors in the development
and monitoring of the corporate environmental strategy (Kassinis and Vafeas 2002). ECE
represent a significant element of this strategy and contribute to environmental
performance management (Buysse and Verbeke 2003; Hart 1995; Clarkson et al. 2006).
Thus, the supervision of environmental strategy by the board of directors encompasses
environmental investments decisions. This coverage of ECE is an essential step in the
monitoring of environmental strategy (either reactive or proactive), because ECE are
necessary both to comply with environmental laws and to improve environmental
performance beyond compliance (Johnston 2005). Accordingly, governance mechanisms
designed to address environmental performance should drive the intensity of ECE.
3 The ethics of corporate environmental protection are underpinned by ecological and human arguments.
For instance, the natural environment deserves ethical consideration by the corporation owing to its
intrinsic value, i.e. plants, animals and all other components of the natural environment are as worthy to
be treated with high moral standards as are human beings (Hoffman 1991). Further, business'
responsibility towards future generations and their environmental rights are embedded in the ethics of the
collective good (Jeurissen and Keijzers 2004), which translate into moral obligations towards the
environment in the present.
4 Environmental strategy is defined as an action plan "intended to manage the interface between business
and the natural environment" (Sharma 2000: 682). The environmental literature depicts the
environmental strategy construct as a continuum with a reactive strategy at one end, and a proactive
strategy at the other (Aragón-Correa 1998). The sole objective of a firm with a reactive strategy is
compliance with legal requirements, while a firm pursuing a proactive strategy aims for environmentally
sustainable development (Hart 1 995).
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1.2.2.2. The role ofgovernance ¡? investment decisions
Part of the corporate governance monitoring function includes the oversight of
investments by the board owing to directors' economic responsibilities (Osma 2008). In
this respect, corporate governance plays a significant role in various investment-related
decisions such as acquisitions (Francis and Smith 1995; Cheng 2008), restructuring
(Gibbs 1993; Hoskisson et al. 1994) and the development of innovation (Tihanyi et al.
2003; Hoskisson et al. 2002; Kroll et al. 2008; Nickerson and Silverman 2003).
Corporate governance also significantly influences research and development (R&D)
spending. R&D expenditures are similar to ECE owing to their discretionary nature
(Johnston 2005; Osma 2008), their potential value for the organization (Clarkson et al.
2004; Deutsch 2007) and their restrained focus (compared with business acquisition, for
instance). A general argument of this literature is that strong governance reduces the
incentives to manipulate R&D investments. Indeed, various features of corporate
governance have a monitoring effect on this investment decision. Board composition and
size affect the level of R&D expenditures, as does directors' compensation (Deutsch
2005, 2007; Cheng 2008; Kor 2006). Ownership structure also impacts the level and
timing of R&D spending (Francis and Smith 1995; Tribo et al. 2007). Board composition
also constrains attempts to manage earnings through cuts in R&D investments (Osma
2008). Collectively, this literature underlines the active stance of corporate governance
vis-à-vis strategic investment decisions such as R&D. The same response can be
expected towards the environmentally strategic decision of ECE investments.
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1.2.2.3. Combining roles
The level of investment in ECE is a corporate decision that contains both a mandatory
and a voluntary element (Johnston 2005). The mandatory element reflects capital
expenditures that are needed to comply with environmental regulation (Johnston 2005).
The voluntary element allows a corporation to move beyond compliance as it positions
itself to face future regulation (Clarkson et al. 2004). Voluntary ECE investments also
reflect a decision to improve current environmental performance in the spirit of
environmental leadership (Hart 1 995). Corporate governance potentially influences both
elements of ECE through its functions. Through its risk management responsibilities
(Jensen and Meckling 1 976; Fama and Jensen 1 983), which include environmental risks,
directors monitor the mandatory component to ensure compliance with environmental
regulations, thereby managing environmental risks. Similarly, as part of the
responsibility to shape and evaluate the firm's environmental strategy (Zahra and Pearce
1989), the board oversees voluntary ECE when the corporation's environmental strategy
aims to go beyond compliance.
In brief, by fulfilling its advice function, the board of directors plays a significant iole m
the development of the environmental strategy, because environmental issues are part of
their social and ethical responsibilities towards stakeholders. Corporate governance can
therefore be expected to positively affect environmental issues that are significant for the
environmental strategy, such as ECE. Further, governance affects the levels of strategic
investments such as R&D expenditures, as executed by the monitoring function of the
board. Corporate governance can therefore be expected to determine the intensity of
another type of strategic investment: ECE. Collectively, these arguments suggest that the
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extent of consideration for the environment at the board level will determine the
proportion of capital expenditures dedicated to environmental protection in given a
corporation. Hence, formally stated:
H: Environment-related governance mechanisms will be positively associated
with the intensity ofECE.
1.3. Method
1.3.1. Sampling process
The sample comprises firms included in the S&P 500 index, operating in the lOxx to
39xx industry SIC codes (environmentally sensitive industries), for whom ECE,
governance, environmental and control data are available. ECE are gathered from 1 0-K
reports, governance data are collected from the Historical Governance database of Audit
Analytics when available and from proxy statements otherwise, environmental
performance originates from the KLD Socrates database (KLD 2009b) and the Corporate
Environmental Profiles Database (RMG 2001), whereas financial data originate from
Compustat. To avoid noise caused by changes in governance policies following the
introduction of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, data collection was performed for post-SOX
years 2003-2007. The final sample comprises 197 firm-year observations.
1.3.2. Empirical model
Intensity ofenvironmental capital expenditures¡,
= / (Environmental governance mechanisms,,, Environmental performance„.j or t.2,
Economic characteristicsu 0n-h Size,,, Industry,,) O- 1)
Equation (1.1) presents the empirical model designed for this study. The intensity of
ECE is examined relative to environmental governance mechanisms and several
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environmental and financial control variables. The intensity of ECE is defined as the
proportion of capital expenditures dedicated to pollution control and abatement. Three
environmental governance mechanisms are examined: the existence of an environmental
board committee, the proportion of environmentally aware directors on the board and the
presence of environmental incentives in executive compensation. These mechanisms are
derived from the financial governance literature, in which similar mechanisms were
found to be relevant to financial decisions and outcomes (see Cohen et al. 2004 for a
review). Both board level and committee level governance variables are integrated in the
model. This is intended to take into account the embeddedness of committees in the
board (Klein 2002; Cohen et al. 2004). Executive level governance then adds an
additional layer of analysis to the model. Multiple governance variables are examined in
order to enrich the portrayal of corporate governance (Vafeas 2005; Cerbioni and
Parbonetti 2007). Controls for size and industry are included in the equation because
ECE are likely to be tailored to both firm size and the nature of the industry in which the
firm operates. Each independent variable is described below.
1. 3.2.1. Environmental governance
Existence of an environmental board committee: The relation between corporate
governance and sustainability can be expressed by a sustainability-related committee at
the board level (KoIk 2008). Indeed, the presence of an environmental committee is a
purely voluntary choice by the board of directors and reflects its intention to oversee
environmental affairs (Lam and Li 2007). Just as the audit committee influences financial
information decisions (Cohen et al. 2004), the environmental committee should positively
influence environmental decisions such as the intensity of ECE.
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Environmentally aware directors: Environmentally aware directors are board members
that can be expected to be knowledgeable about environmental issues given their prior
experience in (1) environmental organizations or (2) a peer industry company. The latter
experience is considered to proxy for environmental awareness because of the directors'
familiarity with the context and the associated environmental issues of the industry in
which the corporation operates. This awareness can be deemed a form of expertise these
members bring to the board. The literature contains two alternative views of the impact of
expertise among board members. For one, board members with industry-specific
expertise may be suspected of defending management's poor environmental strategy to
protect their industry's financial interests to the detriment of the environment (Kassinis
- and Vafeas 2002). In contrast, evidence that financial expertise on the audit committee
reduces earnings management and restatements (Xie et al. 2003; Bédard et al. 2004;
Abbott et al. 2004) and increases internal control quality (Goh 2009; Hoitash et al. 2009)
suggests that just as financial expertise improves financial monitoring, environmental
expertise may help board members monitor financial decisions such as ECE. Given these
competing views, no prediction is made with respect to the direction of the relationship
between environmentally aware directors and ECE intensity.
Environmental incentives in executive compensation: Executive compensation influences
corporate social and environmental performance (Mahoney and Thorne 2005, 2006).
Indeed, environmental incentives are drivers of environmental performance (Henri and
Journeault 2007) and as such can be considered relevant elements of environmental
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governance (Lam and Li 2007). Focusing executives' attention on environmental issues
via their compensation should lead them to spend more on ECE.
/. 3. 2. 2. Environmental performance
Environmental weaknesses: Environmental performance levels (good or bad) trigger
responses by the performing corporation (e.g. Al-Tuwaijri et al. 2004; Patten 2002;
Deegan and Rankin 1996). ECE intensity can be considered a potential response to this
performance. In other words, environmental performance results help shape the
environmental strategy (including ECE) and enable the company to take the necessary
steps to meet the established environmental objectives (Rodrigue et al. 2009). In this way,
past environmental performance will determine the necessary ECE for the upcoming
years. It is expected that weak environmental performers in a given year will require
more investments in ECE in the following year in order to remain compliant with
environmental regulation.
Environmental compliance is proxied by two variables: environmental violations and
environmental fines. Violations of environmental regulation are an important aspect of
environmental performance (Kassinis and Vafeas 2002) and, as such, environmental
compliance is the minimum level of performance targeted by all types of environmental
strategies (Hart 1995). In the present study, the number of environmental violations
identifies the existence of a compliance problem within a corporation, whereas
environmental fines represent the economic consequences associated with this problem.
Non-compliance with environmental regulation can be solved with investments in ECE
(Johnston 2005). Accordingly, both violations and fines are expected to be positively
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associated with ECE intensity. To allow for the length of legal procedures and for the
interval until the consequences of these procedures reach the organization, a lag of two
years is integrated in the model between the two independent variables and intensity of
ECE.
1.3.2.3. Economic characteristics
Profitability and growth in cashflows: The financial resources available to a corporation
in a given year will determine the change in its environmental performance in the
following years (Clarkson et al. 2006). Specifically, economic factors may influence ECE
investment decisions (Patten 2005) and thus need to be controlled for. In the present
context, lag profitability is meant to represent the general economic situation of the
corporation, whereas growth in cashflows is intended to portray the increase in liquidity
available for (environmental) investments more directly.
Age of assets: Older property, plants and equipment employ more pollution intensive
technologies (Cormier and Magnan 1999; Cormier and Magnan 2004). The age of these
assets should drive investments in ECE for compliance and update purposes.
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1.3.3. Variable measurement and data collection
Table 1: Variable measurement
VARIABLES MEASUREMENT








Proportion of environmentally aware




Indicator = 1 if environmental incentives are
included in executive compensation
Environmental
performance
Environmental weaknesses Total number of environmental concerns
attributed by KLD (score out of 7)
Environmental violations Total number of violations
Environmental fines Fines attributed for environmental violations
scaled by sales (Fines/Sales)
Profitability ROA
Growth in cash flow Increase in cash flow over the last 3 years
Age of assets Net PPE/Gross PPE
Size Log(Total Assets)
Industry Industry indicator variables
Table 1 summarizes the measurement of the variables. The intensity of investments in
ECE is calculated by scaling ECE by the total capital expenditures of a given year. As for
environmental governance, a firm is considered to have a board committee with a clear
environmental mandate if it has a "public policy," "public affairs/' "public issues,"
"social responsibility," "corporate responsibility," "sustainability," "sustainable
development" or "environmental" committee listed in the Historical Governance database
of Audit Analytics. Environmental awareness on the board was established by reading
the directors' descriptions gathered from the same database. Any director with prior
experience in the same two-digit industry SIC code as the corporation is considered
knowledgeable about the industry and its environmental issues and as such brings
environmental awareness to the board. Any director with prior experience in an
environmental organization is also considered to raise environmental awareness. Any
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corporation that attributes importance to environmental performance in its compensation
approach is classified as offering environmental incentives. For the purpose of
classification, the executive compensation section of the proxy statement was read to
identify whether environmental performance is taken into consideration in executive
compensation. In addition, I searched for the keywords "social responsibility,"
"environment," "sustainability," "pollution," "ecology," "qualitative" and "non-
financial" in the proxy statement to ensure full coverage.
Environmental weaknesses are measured by the score of the KLD Socrates database.
KLD data have been widely used in management research (e.g. Graves and Waddock
1994; Johnson and Greening 1999) and are now employed in environmental accounting
research (Cho et al. 2006; Cho and Patten 2007). KLD conducts a detailed assessment of
corporate social, environmental and governance performance each year for almost 3000
companies (KLD 2009a). The environmental criteria examined in this assessment are
listed in Appendix 1. Strengths and concerns are identified for each corporation as a
result of the process. In the context of ECE intensity, at the very least, corporations have
to invest in ECE to manage their environmental (compliance) weaknesses (concerns, in
the KLD vocabulary), whereas ECE are not necessarily required by environmental
strengths. This intuitively hints towards employing concerns as a measure of
environmental performance in the model. This intuition is supported by prior work using
concerns as the main measure of environmental performance (Cho and Patten 2007). The
total number of environmental concerns attributed by KLD represents the environmental
performance variable of the model.
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Environmental compliance is measured based on the data provided by the Corporate
Environmental Profiles Database of the Risk Metrics Group. This database compiles the
number of civil, criminal and administrative violations and the corresponding penalties
related to eight environmental Acts (RMG 2001). These Acts cover energy, air, water
and chemical issues. A detailed list of the environmental regulations encompassed by the
database is provided in Appendix 2. This database, although still not widely employed in
the academic literature, is built on sound raw data, because the Risk Metrics Group uses
federal U.S. agencies (primarily the Environmental Protection Agency) as its source of
information (RMG 2001).
Finally, financial control variables are measured as follows. Profitability is measured by
return on assets (ROA). Growth in cash flows is measured as the increase in cash flows in
the three years preceding the ECE investment. The ratio of net to gross PPE proxies for
the age of assets (Cormier and Magnan 1 999). Size is measured as the logarithm of total
assets and industries indicator variables are employed.
1.4. Results
1.4.1. Descriptive statistics
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics on ECE, environmental governance and financial
and environmental control variables. The median ECE per year amounts to $31 million
(mean: $145.11 million)5 and a sample firm spends on average 7.22% of its capital
expenditures on ECE. 51% of sample firms have an environmental committee and 35%
5 The average ECE of $145.11 million is similar to the 2005 average ECE of $167.8 million reported by
Cho and Patten (2008). These authors also reported that, on average, ECE in their 2005 sample
comprised 0.57% of the assets. ECE in my sample roughly correspond to 0.48% of assets ($145.11
million/ $30 362 million), in line with the previous findings.
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have environmental incentives in their executive compensation package. On average,
11% of board members are considered environmentally aware. In terms of
environmental performance, sample firms have on average 2.05 environmental
weaknesses and 2.01 violations per year. The mean environmental fine in the sample is
$2.79 per $1 million of sales. As for economic characteristics, firms in the sample are
large, with assets totaling $30 362 million on average. They are profitable (mean ROA
7.13%) and experience growth in cash flows (16.64% on average). The mean age of
assets is 50.87%, meaning that the assets are about halfway through their useful life. The
sample is spread across six industry categories, and is dominated by firms from the
petroleum (21.8%) and the chemicals (34%) sectors. Table 3 provides correlations
between the variables. Most of the independent variables are significantly correlated
with the dependent variable ECE intensity. The correlation matrix does not show high
correlation among independent variables in general; only one of the correlation
coefficients exceeds 0.50 (size and environmental weaknesses at 0.644).
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics
Mean Median Std dev. Min Max
ECE ($ million) 145.11
ECE intensity 0.0722
Environmental governance
Environmental committee 0.5 1
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Growth in cash flows 0. 1 664
Age of assets 0.5087
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Table 4 presents the results of the pooled cross-sectional Ordinary Least Squares (OLS)
regression of ECE on environmental governance using robust standard errors to account
for OLS assumption violations (Huber 1967; White 1980). Year and industry effects were
controlled for but are not shown. I hypothesize that environmental governance
mechanisms are positively related to ECE intensity based on a stakeholder and ethical
perspective of governance. Results provide some support for this hypothesis. Firms with
an environmental committee invest more in ECE than firms without this mechanism
(p< 0.0751). Environmental awareness among directors (p< 0.348) and environmental
incentives in executive compensation (p< 0.246) do not significantly influence the
intensity of ECE. The environmental committee is therefore the governance mechanism
with the most impact on ECE investment decisions. As for environmental control
variables, firms with more environmental weaknesses (p< 0.000) and greater
environmental fines (p< 0.084) spend more on ECE the following year but these
investments are not determined by the number of environmental violations (p< 0.149)
from two years ago. Economic characteristics also affect ECE intensity. Indeed, growth
in cash flows is associated with greater ECE spending (p < 0.006).6 More profitable firms
spend relatively less on ECE (p< 0.002) and firms with newer assets spend more on ECE
(p< 0.000).7 Overall, the results of this analysis suggest that ECE intensity is strongly
driven by environmental performance and economic characteristics but only marginally
driven by environmental governance.
These results are in line with prior literature that demonstrated that greater cash flows are typical of
corporations deciding to improve their environmental performance (Clarkson et al. 2006).
7 These results contrast with prior findings showing that economic performance is a driver of environmental
performance and disclosure (Cormier and Magnan 2003; Al-Tuwaijiri et al. 2004; Clarkson et al. 2006).
This contrast might be explained by the specific nature of ECE in comparison to the broad scope of
environmental performance or disclosure.
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t= year of Expected ECE intensity
































Note: * ? < 0.10; ** ? < 0.05; ***p < 0.01 . One-tailed if there is a predicted sign, two-tailed otherwise.
Year and industries indicators not shown.
1.4.2.1. Characteristics of the environmental committee
The above analysis provides evidence that the presence of an environmental committee
on the board stimulates greater environmental investments. The financial governance
literature shows that characteristics of board committees have an impact on financial
information, results and decisions (Beasley et al. 2000; Xie et al. 2003; Vafeas 2005;
Kanagaretnam et al. 2007). This suggests that environmental committee characteristics
are likely to influence ECE intensity decisions. For the sample firms that have an
environmental committee (n=100), I examine the impact of two committee
characteristics: committee size and number ofmeetings.
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On average, the environmental committee of the sample firms comprises 4.83 members
and meets 3.38 times a year. The size of a board committee can be considered reflective
of its power and effectiveness (Becker-Blease and Irani 2008). Goh (2009) shows that
larger audit committees are more successful at remediating to internal control weaknesses
in a timely manner than smaller ones. This suggests that larger environmental
committees should be more influential regarding environmental decisions and hence
should positively influence ECE intensity. As for the number of meetings of the
environmental committee, Larcker et al. (2007) consider meetings an indication of the
level of monitoring exerted by the board. This implies that with respect to environmental
matters, more frequent meetings of the environmental committee should trigger greater
ECE intensity. To investigate the impact of environmental committee size and activity
on ECE intensity, I use these two variables to replace the environmental committee
variable in Equation (1.1). Results are presented in Table 5.
! Given the small sample size, results should be interpreted with caution and considered exploratory.
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Note: * ? < 0.10; ** ? < 0.05; ***p < 0.01. One-tailed if there is a predicted sign, two-tailed otherwise.
Year and industry indicators not shown.
Larger environmental committees marginally influence the intensity of ECE (p<0.066),
consistent with the view that larger committees are more effective and influential
(Becker-Blease and Irani 2008). Committee activity does not appear to influence ECE
decisions, because the number of meetings is not associated with the intensity of
environmental spending (p< 0.363). Interestingly, for firms that have an environmental
committee, environmentally aware directors (p< 0.037) and environmental incentives in
36
executive compensation (p< 0.03) positively influence ECE intensity. The
environmental committee thus appears to be the key governance mechanism that allows
the other mechanisms to be effective. These findings provide support for the hypothesis
that governance has an impact on ECE intensity. They show that directors recognize their
environmental responsibilities and implement mechanisms that ensure the established
environmental standards are followed in the organization. As for the impact of
environmental performance on ECE intensity, lagged environmental weaknesses
(p< 0.029) and two-year lagged environmental violations (p< 0.028) are associated with
more intense ECE investment, consistent with expectations. However, two-year lagged
environmental fines are marginally negatively related to ECE intensity (p< 0.068).
Results for economic characteristics are similar to those of the prior regression, apart
from profitability, which is no longer significant. Taken as a whole, these results show
how environmental governance mechanisms, environmental performance and economic
conditions influence the intensity of ECE for firms with an environmental committee.
1.4.2.2. Interaction ofgovernance and environmental strategy
The analysis in this section concentrates on the complexity of corporate governance and
environmental management. Larcker et al. (2007) argue that the complexity of corporate
governance is better captured by grouping governance mechanisms into dimensions.
These authors performed an exploratory analysis of financial corporate governance using
principal component analysis to group mechanisms into distinct dimensions or factors. I
adopt their approach to build an environmental governance factor. Specifically, I use
9 The results for environmentally aware directors also argue in favor of the view that expertise at the board
level improves the monitoring function (Xie et al. 2003; Abbott et al. 2004; Bédard et al. 2004).
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principal component analysis to determine if the existence of an environmental
committee, the proportion of environmentally aware directors and the presence of
environmental incentives in executive compensation can be grouped in a single
governance dimension. Results, presented in Table 6A, confirm that these mechanisms
all load on the same factor, which has an eigenvalue of 1.412 and explains 47.07% of the
total variance in the data. The loading (the correlation between the factor and the
variable) of the three variables are satisfying because they all exceed 0.40 (committee =
0.761; environmentally aware directors = 0.505 and incentives = 0.759) and are
statistically different from zero at conventional levels (Larcker et al. 2007).
ECE are composed of mandatory and voluntary elements (Johnston 2005), thus adding
another layer of complexity to the study. The voluntary element implies that firms choose
to invest more (or less) in ECE based on their environmental strategy (Hart 1995). Firms
with a proactive environmental strategy are likely to spend more on ECE than firms with
a reactive environmental strategy (Hunt and Auster 1990). The impact of governance on
ECE is then likely to depend on the environmental strategy of the firm. This implies that
to better circumscribe the influence of environmental governance on ECE intensity, it is
necessary to take into account the interaction of the environmental strategy with
environmental governance.
Because the environmental strategy is unobservable, 1 rely on environmental performance
to proxy for it, in line with Clarkson et al. (2006). More specifically, I use exploratory
principal component analysis to combine all environmental performance measures into a
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unique factor representing corporate environmental strategy. Results are presented in
Table 6B. All environmental performance variables (weaknesses, violations and fines)
load on the same factor, with an eigenvalue of 1 .494 and a proportion of explained total
variance in the data of 49.79%. All variables load adequately on the factor with loadings
of 0.755 (weaknesses), 0.807 (violations) and 0.523 (fines) and are statistically different
from zero at conventional levels. Given the negative environmental issues composing the
factor, a higher factor score is interpreted as a more reactive environmental strategy.














































I perform an OLS regression on these two factors and financial control variables to
examine the impact of the environmental governance dimension on ECE intensity and to
investigate the potential interaction effect of environmental strategy and environmental
governance on ECE intensity. Results are presented in Table 7. The environmental
governance factor is positively associated with ECE intensity (p< 0.023). Better
39
environmental governance triggers greater environmental investments, as predicted.
Environmental governance is used as a means to manage corporate environmental
responsibilities and meet stakeholder expectations by enabling greater ECE investments.
The environmental strategy factor is also positively associated with ECE intensity
(p< 0.001), implying that worse environmental performers in prior years are likely to
spend more on ECE in the following year. The interaction of environmental governance
and environmental strategy is negatively related to ECE intensity (p< 0.041). This
suggests that a reactive environmental strategy reduces the investment intensity triggered
by environmental governance. This finding highlights how the impact of environmental
governance on environmental investment might be limited without corporate governance
being accompanied by proactive environmental strategy. In other words, a reactive
environmental strategy reduces the importance to meet stakeholder expectations and to
protect the environment generated by the stakeholder- and ethics-based conception of
governance developed in this paper. Finally, results for economic characteristics are
similar to those of the initial regression in Table 4.
40




Environmental governance factor + 2.02** 0.023
Environmental strategy factor + 3.17*** 0.001
Governance factor X Strategy factor +/- -2.06** 0.041
Economic characteristics
Profitability (ROA) -3.18*** 0.001
Growth in cash flows 2.67*** 0.004





Note: * ? < 0.10; ** ? < 0.05; ***p < 0.01. One-tailed if there is a predicted sign, two-tailed otherwise.
Year and industry indicators not shown.
1 .4.3. Sensitivity analyses
A pooled sample of firm-year observations like the one employed in this study comprises
more than one observation from the same company. As such, observations are not
independent as assumed in OLS regression technique and the above use of OLS may
have lead to misspecification. Sensitivity analyses were conducted to examine this issue.
First, I used a pooled GLS technique to estimate the regression coefficients (Clarkson et
al. 2004). GLS results (untabulated) for the initial model (Equation 1.1) are all similar to
the results from the OLS regression, with the addition that environmental awareness
among directors becomes significant (p< 0.03), reinforcing the impact of governance on
ECE intensity. Results from the environmental committee characteristic regression all
hold when GLS technique is employed, except for environmental fines which are no
longer significant (p< 0.1 84). Results from the GLS regression on the interaction between
the governance dimension and the environmental strategy dimensions are also consistent
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with those of the OLS regression for all the independent variables. Again to test the
sensitivity of the results to the use of the OLS technique on pooled data, I also conducted
OLS regressions controlling for firm effect instead of industry effects (untabulated). All
results are consistent with the results presented in the previous sections, with the
exception of the size of the environmental committee, which is no longer related to ECE
intensity (p< 0.129) in the model focusing on the impact of environmental committee
characteristics on ECE. Collectively, results from these analyses support the hypothesis
developed in this paper. They strengthen the findings that environmental governance is a
driver of ECE investments.
Significant attention is given to endogeneity in recent governance- research (Campbell
and Minguez-Vera 2008; Linck et al. 2008; Boone et al. 2007; Coles et al. 2008).
Interrelations potentially exist between ECE, environmental governance and
environmental performance. As posited in the hypothesis, environmental governance is
thought to influence the intensity of ECE. Environmental governance was also shown to
influence the litigation component of environmental performance (Kassinis and Vafeas
2002). ECE being meant to improve pollution abatement and control, they also have an
influence over future environmental performance. Nonetheless, both environmental
governance and ECE can be driven by environmental performance, if they are considered
to be corporate responses to poor or superior environmental performance (Al-Tuwaijri et
al. 2004; Clarkson et al. 2008). The potential simultaneous impact of environmental
governance, environmental performance and ECE on one another requires testing for
endogeneity. Results from the Hausman test show that endogeneity was not significant
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for these interrelationships (ECE and environmental governance: p< 0.12; ECE and
environmental performance: ? < 0.22). Cormier et al. (2009) obtain similar results from
the Hausman test and conclude to the absence of endogeneity. They then proceed to their
analyses without further consideration for endogeneity issues. Thus, for the purpose of
this paper, it is legitimate to examine the impact of environmental governance on ECE in
isolation.
1.5. Discussion and conclusion
The purpose of this essay was to investigate the impact of environmental governance on
ECE intensity. It was argued that, from a stakeholder and ethical perspective on
governance, significant environmental issues such as ECE are part of the scope of
corporate governance owing to directors' economic, social and ethical responsibilities.
From this conceptual framework the hypothesis was derived that governance mechanisms
committed to environmental protection and stakeholder accountability increase the
proportion of capital expenditures dedicated to pollution abatement and control. Results
from the analysis of a pooled cross-sectional sample of 197 observations from firms
operating in environmentally sensitive industries over the period 2003 to 2007 show that
environmental governance mechanisms influence ECE, but mostly under certain
circumstances. In general, environmental governance only marginally influences ECE
intensity, through the existence of an environmental board committee (Table 4).
However, when firms have an environmental committee in place, the size of this
committee, along with the presence of environmentally aware directors and
environmental incentives in executive compensation have a positive impact on ECE
intensity (Table 5). Environmental strategy also affects the relationship between
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environmental governance and ECE intensity. Indeed, it was shown that a reactive
environmental strategy reduces the positive impact of governance on ECE investment
(Table 7). These results support the conceptual argument that directors are aware of their
environmental responsibilities towards stakeholders and implement governance
mechanisms to ensure that the established environmental standards are followed
throughout the organization. In doing so, directors also fulfill their economic
responsibilities by overseeing to strategic investment decisions.
The paper differentiates itself from prior ECE literature owing to its focus on the
determinants of ECE investments. Whereas research on the determinants of ECE
disclosure shows that ECE are reported for purposes of legitimacy (Patten 2005; Cho et
al. 2009), this paper provides evidence that ECE are spent for directors to fulfill their
environmental responsibilities. This paper also complements research on the market
consequences of ECE investments (Clarkson et al. 2004; Johnston 2005) by taking a step
back to understand the motivations underlying these investments. Finally, the study
contributes to the broader social accounting and governance literatures not only by
analyzing governance mechanisms neglected by prior research, but also by performing
the analysis into an under-researched environmental accounting context.
Although the paper shows that environmental governance increases ECE investment, the
fact that its effectiveness depends on the circumstances suggests that environmental
governance is not the main driver of environmental expenditures. Given that the research
motivation was to explore whether environmental governance contributes to greater
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environmental protection or to greenwashing, these results indicate that the signal of
environmental concern sent by these governance mechanisms translates into minor pro-
environment actions. Future research should investigate whether environmental
governance translates into greater pro-environment actions in other contexts. This would
be helpful to position the role of environmental governance in a corporation's move
toward improved environmental performance. Studying the determinants of
environmental governance mechanisms as well as their impact on environmental
performance would also help set the bases of the emerging body of knowledge on
environmental governance.
Different limitations of the study need to be acknowledged. First, because the analysis
was performed on firms from environmentally sensitive industries, the results may not
apply to firms from other industries. However, this limitation also implies that results are
applicable to the most polluting industries, thereby providing them with means to
improve their environmental performance. Second, focusing on ECE implies that results
will not be automatically generalizable to other types of environmental decisions. The
fact that the environmental issue examined in this study is relevant to investors, as
demonstrated by prior ECE research (Clarkson et al. 2004; Johnston 2005),
counterbalances this by indicating that a significant aspect of environmental accounting is
analysed. Future research may investigate other environmental decisions such as
environmental management system implementation. Third, the governance mechanisms
analyzed are not exhaustive. However, significant efforts have been made to maximize.
the relevance of the findings for practitioners by selecting some of the most prevalent
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environmental governance mechanisms found in practice. Other environmental
governance mechanisms have been left for future research. These limitations do not
prevent the study from contributing to the literature by providing exploratory insights on
the influence of environmental governance mechanisms on ECE investment decisions,
thereby showing how corporate governance can contribute to the protection of
stakeholders' environmental interests.
46
Chapter 2: Stakeholders' influence over the choice of
internal environmental performance indicators
Abstract
This paper explores how stakeholders influence a firm's choice of internal environmental
performance indicators (EPI) included in strategic performance measurement systems.
Internal EPI are used to support management in decision-making and performance
evaluation. Relying on stakeholder and legitimacy theories, we conduct a field
investigation within a large multinational operating in an environmentally sensitive
industry. Our investigation comprises interviews with key environmental executives at
the case firm's world headquarters, a review of corporate documents, and examination of
information obtained directly from the case firm's stakeholders. Our analysis indicates
that stakeholders influence the choice of internal EPI in four ways, which we aggregate in
a continuum. The firm's environmental impact on specific stakeholders and its need for
legitimization underlie the continuum. This study extends research on the relationships
among stakeholders, society and corporate environmental management and provides
insights into how environmental considerations are integrated in a firm's internal
strategic performance measurement system.
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2.1. Introduction
This paper explores how stakeholders influence a firm's choice of internal environmental
performance indicators (EPI). Internal EPI are used to support management in decision-
making and performance evaluation. Stakeholders such as customers, investors,
employees, governments and communities are increasingly concerned with corporate
environmental issues (e.g. Cormier et al. 2004; Henriques and Sadorsky 1999) and with
the methods corporations employ to measure, monitor and report on these issues (Bouma
and Kamp-Roelands 2000; O'Dwyer et al. 2005b). To deal with these concerns, firms
have increased the level of environmental information included in their annual reports,
and several now publish sustainable development reports with EPI such as greenhouse
gas emissions and energy consumption. From an internal control perspective,
management must consider and weigh stakeholders' concerns and society's expectations
to select the set of internal EPI to be monitored. Despite numerous references to
stakeholders' environmental concerns in the literature, little is known about their actual
influence over a firm's choice of internal EPI (Ayuso 2006; e.g. Berthelot et al. 2003).
This paper reports findings from an exploratory study of the interrelations between
stakeholders and internal EPI selection. The paper adopts a field research methodology
that relies on complementary information sources: interviews with executives, a review
of corporate documents and policies and examination of information obtained directly
from stakeholder sources. The field setting is a large organization with worldwide
operations in an environmentally sensitive sector.10 Interviews were conducted with key
10 A confidentiality agreement with the organization prevents us from revealing details that may lead to its
identification.
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environmental executives from the firm's global headquarters. We rely on stakeholder
theory and legitimacy theory to guide our work.
Based on our analysis, we develop a continuum where stakeholders influence the firm's
choice of internal EPI in four ways. First, stakeholders affect the firm via their impact on
environmental strategy, which is a mediated influence on EPI choice. In addition to this
indirect influence, the firm is subject to direct pressure from stakeholders concerning
which EPI it chooses to manage environmental performance. Third, stakeholders' direct
and indirect influence can evolve into a joint effort where stakeholders and the firm
interact to achieve a common environmental goal. Fourth, the influence of this
relationship broadens when stakeholders provide the- firm with a way to evaluate its
environmental performance; this environmental benchmarking influence imposes
additional pressure on the firm to adjust its environmental strategy and EPI choice.
The firm's environmental effects on stakeholders, as well as its organizational legitimacy
needs, represent the underlying drivers of these influences. Such a continuum of
influences does not appear in the literature. Until now, most environmental and
stakeholder-based studies have depicted stakeholders' environmental influence on firms
as straightforward and one-directional (e.g. see Cormier et al. 2004; Roberts 1992;
Kassinis and Vafeas 2006). By suggesting a continuum, our results extend prior research
by demonstrating stakeholders' influences in a more nuanced manner than the one-
directional approach reported in the literature. Therefore, this study contributes to
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research on relationships among stakeholders, society and corporate environmental
management.
Gaining a better understanding of how firms select environmental performance measures,
beyond the information they disclosed, is important for multiple reasons. First, sizable
financial resources are now allocated to green and socially responsible investment funds,
whose portfolios include firms that are perceived to have the correct profile based on
their disclosure (e.g., Dow Jones Sustainability Index). A similar argument can be made
for firms that embrace social responsibility or green indices. It thus appears critical to
map the process underlying the construction of a firm's environmental performance.
Second, with the emergence and widespread adoption of disclosure platforms such as the
Global Reporting Initiative, it is only a matter of time before stricter reporting and
measurement standards emerge with respect to environmental performance. For standards
to be effective, they will have to be based on the accurate mapping of all parties involved
in the determination of EPI. Third, for boards and management that face the upcoming
challenges that underlie sustainable development, how they manage their relationships
and interact with various stakeholders is critical to their firm's future. Our study provides
insight into this interaction. Otherwise stated, the paper extends the strategic performance
measurement systems literature into a new realm that more closely matches current
concerns about environmental issues with the control challenges organizations face in
addressing them.
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The paper's sequence is as follows: Section 2.2 presents environmental performance
indicators; Section 2.3 positions our theoretical background composed of stakeholder and
legitimacy theories; Section 2.4 describes the research methodology; Section 2.5 provides
an analysis of the information collected; Section 2.6 corroborates results from interviews
with information obtained from stakeholders; Section 2.7 reviews the continuum of
stakeholders' influences over EPI choice with a discussion on theoretical perspectives.
The last section offers concluding comments.
2.2. Environmental Performance Indicators
Environmental performance indicators (EPI) can be defined as "specific expressions that
provide information about... [the] results of an organization's management of its
environmental aspects" (ISO 1999, p. 2). Significant differences exist between publicly
disclosed EPI and internal EPI used by managers. Internal EPI are specific, strategic and
numerous and support decision-making and performance evaluation (Chenhall 2003;
Kaplan and Norton 2004; Henri and Journeault 2009). Conversely, externally disclosed
EPI typically comprise a few aggregate numbers that are assembled from the list of
internal EPI. For example, internal EPI developed for greenhouse gases are monitored
according to each of the categories of gases emitted by the firm, whereas externally
disclosed indicators are derived from a selection and grouping of the internal individual
greenhouse gas indicators. Therefore, external EPI represent voluntary environmental
disclosure and provide, at best, a general and partial account of a firm's environmental
performance (Adams 2004; Patten 2002). Our paper focuses on internal EPI, rather than
externally disclosed EPI. This focus allows us to analyze the environmental performance
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management processes rather than the outputs of those processes as portrayed by the firm
through its external disclosure.
In line with the environmental management accounting literature, we position internal
EPI within the strategic performance measurement system (SPMS) (Bartolomeo et al.
2000). An SPMS is a management accounting system having a set of performance
measures designed to align managers' actions with the strategy of the organization
(Atkinson et al. 1997; Webb 2004). An SPMS contains multiple performance measures,
including EPI, and may have different purposes including monitoring, which
encompasses the measurement of performance measures to meet stakeholders'
requirements, and legitimizing, to justify and validate a firm's current and future actions
and enhance credibility (Henri, 2006). Therefore, focusing on internal EPI concentrates
the research on EPI that represent the concrete implementation of the corporate
environmental strategy (Ittner et al. 2003; Chenhall 2003) and that are crucial to the
monitoring of corporate environmental performance (Henri and Joumeault 2009).
Knowledge of EPI arises from two broad perspectives. The first perspective focuses on
the inclusion of EPI in management systems. Firms may integrate environmental issues,
including EPI, in their SPMS (e.g. diNorcia 1996; Figge et al. 2002). Relying on the
Balanced Scorecard concept, Van der Woerd and Van der Brink (2004) develop a
Responsive Scorecard and conduct a pilot study on the implementation of EPI in the
tourism industry. Similarly, Caldelli and Parmigiani (2004) elaborate on and test an
approach to evaluate how well a management information system, including EPI, could
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provide the information required to monitor its sustainability objectives. Henri and
Journeault (2009) illustrate that environmental performance measurement systems,
defined as the diversity and intensity of EPI usage within an organization, are broadly
included in manufacturing firms' performance measurement systems. These recent
studies examined the integration of EPI in managerial decision-making systems.
The second perspective focuses on the various EPI attributes firms publicly disclose,
since EPI embedded in SPMS are useful not only in decision making but also for external
reporting purposes (Henri and Journeault 2009). Based on this perspective, the
characteristics and features of effective EPI have been applied to EPI disclosures in water
company reports (Johnston and Smith 2001). Marshall and Brown (2003) also describe
publicly disclosed EPI, but unlike Johnson and Smith, they base their analyses on
recommendations from the European Environmental Agency and focus their attention on
the attributes of publicly available EPI in environmental reports.
The first research perspective on EPI acknowledges its internal use with SPMS, while the
second perspective focuses on the use and shortcomings of EPI in publicly disclosed
corporate reports. The strategic importance of internal EPI in decision-making and the
low quality of externally disclosed EPI highlight the relevance of focusing our research
work on internal rather than external EPI. Until now, knowledge about internal
indicators remains elusive, since their selection has yet to be explicitly examined.
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2.3. Theoretical background: Stakeholders, Society and Environmental Issues
Our literature review indicates that the most frequently adopted theoretical perspectives
in environmental accounting research are stakeholder theory and legitimacy theory
(Deegan and Blomquist 2006; Gray et al. 1995). This section summarizes the way these
theories have been applied to explain corporate environmental management.
2.3.1. Stakeholders
The stakeholder perspective emphasizes the need for managers to take stakeholders'
demands into account in the strategic management process (Roberts 1992; Mitchell et al.
1997). Stakeholders are "persons or groups that have, or claim, ownership, rights, or
interests in a corporation and its activities, past, present, or future. Such claimed rights or
interest are the result of transactions with, or actions taken by, the corporation, and may
be legal or moral, individual or collective" (Clarkson 1995: 106). Applied to
environmental management, this theoretical perspective highlights the interaction
between stakeholders and organizations on environmental matters. Research on the
interface between stakeholders and firms regarding corporate environmental performance
can be classified into four dimensions. First, prior research suggests that managers are
aware of stakeholders' environmental concerns and recognize the need to address them.
For example, Henriques and Sadorsky (1996) suggest that firms implement an
environmental plan as a result of environmental demands arising from their customers,
shareholders, governments and community. Harvey and Schaeffer (2001) show that
managers recognize and respond to green stakeholder concerns on different levels
because of the impacts these concerns may have on their organization. Therefore, the first
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perspective suggests that managers are responsive to environmental pressures arising
from different stakeholder's groups.
Second, the development and implementation of an environmental strategy allows firms
to identify and integrate stakeholders' environmental concerns." Henriques and Sadorsky
(1999) show that firms with proactive environmental management are concerned about
more stakeholder groups than firms pursuing a reactive environmental strategy. Buysse
and Verbeke (2003) show that as a firm's environmental strategy evolves from a reactive
approach to a proactive one, the depth and scope of its stakeholder focus increases. In
other words, the environmental strategy adopted by a firm affects the range of
stakeholders it considers important.
Third, through external reporting of environmental information, firms are able to convey
some of their environmental management information to stakeholders. Roberts (1992)
finds that the level of social responsibility information disclosed by a firm, including
environmental information, is related to the intensity of stakeholder power. Cormier,
Gordon and Magnan (2004) examine the different categories of environmental
information disclosed by firms and their association with stakeholders, and find that "the
decision to disclose specific types of environmental information is related to corporate
concerns reflective of the stakeholder groups [the] environmental managers associate
1 ' Environmental strategy is defined as an action plan "intended to manage the interface between business
and the natural environment" (Sharma 2000, p. 682). The environmental literature represents the
environmental strategy construct as a continuum, where at one end there is a reactive strategy and at the
other end there is a proactive strategy (Aragón-Correa 1998). A firm pursuing a reactive strategy has as its
sole objective conformity with legal requirements, while a firm pursuing a proactive strategy has a goal of
environmental sustainable development (Hart 1995).
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with these concerns" (p. 159). Deegan and Blomquist (2006) report that the development
of an environmental report and scoring grid by WWF-Australia (formerly the World
Wide Fund for Nature) led Australian firms in the mineral industry to enhance their
environmental-reporting behavior. Overall, prior research suggests that a firm's
stakeholders influence its environmental disclosure.
Fourth, one emerging theme is the relationship between stakeholders and environmental
performance. Kassinis and Vafeas (2006) show that the community represents a powerful
stakeholder group capable of influencing a firm's EPI, such as its reduction of toxic
emissions at the plant level.
Prior research on the interface between stakeholders and firms' environmental
management performance focuses on four complementary dimensions representing
managerial stakeholder considerations regarding corporate environmental concerns,
environmental strategy, environmental disclosure and environmental performance.
Despite the underlying importance of internal EPI in these dimensions, the role played by
stakeholders in their selection has yet to attract significant attention.
2.3.2. Legitimacy
While stakeholder theory concentrates on different groups within society, legitimacy
theory adopts the perspective of society as a whole (Deegan 2006; Deegan and Blomquist
2006). We select the following definition of legitimacy to guide our work:
"Organizations seek to establish congruence between the social values
associated with or implied by their activities and the norms of acceptable
behaviour in the larger social system in which they are a part. Insofar as
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these two value systems are congruent, we can speak of organizational
legitimacy" (Dowling and Pfeffer 1975, 122).
To achieve legitimacy, organizations must take actions to align their business operations
with corporate behaviors accepted by society. Several studies confirm that management
will adopt specific strategies based on perceptions of what the broader community and
society expect regarding environmental matters (Guthrie and Parker 1989; Neu et al.
1998; O'Donovan 1999; Patten 1992). Research also suggests management will inform
society about their activities (Deegan and Blomquist 2006), which in turn reinforces the
importance of studying their choice of EPI.
Most environmental accounting research that adopts legitimacy theory focuses on
external environmental disclosure. Within that context, environmental disclosure
decisions aim to present the firm in a positive way, and corporate reports are viewed as a
public relations document used by management to convey favourable environmental
performance (Neu et al. 1998). Concerns about legitimacy are drivers of environmental
reporting (Gray et al. 1995; Deegan et al. 2002; Cormier et al. 2005). For instance, Milne
and Patten (2002) and Cho (2009) find that communication strategies may help restore or
repair organizational legitimacy. O'Donovan (2002) finds that when an issue or event is
of little importance, it is not considered a threat to legitimacy and therefore is not
mentioned in annual reports. De Villiers and Van Staden (2006) argue that despite
reductions in disclosure in terms of the quantity and specificity of environmental
information, firms can maintain their legitimacy if societal expectations veer away from
environmental issues.
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In short, prior legitimacy research indicates that environmental disclosure practices allow
more effective management of a firm's visibility, accountability and public relations.
Although internal EPI can subsequently be used for external disclosure purposes (Henri
and Journeault 2009), little is known about how internal EPI are selected and used by
firms in their attempts to legitimize their environmental management.
Stakeholder and legitimacy theories can be seen as complementary, the former offering a
micro perspective, the latter a macro perspective (Deegan 2006; Deegan and Blomquist
2006; Cormier et al. 2004). Collectively, these theories can provide a better
understanding of organizational behaviour (Gray et al. 1995). The purpose of this study
is to examine how a large firm is influenced by its stakeholders in its choice of EPI using
the lenses provided by stakeholder and legitimacy theories. Our objective is to extend the
literature on the role of stakeholders and society in shaping firms' behavior towards the
environment.
2.4. Research Methodology
We adopt the field study approach to investigate stakeholders' influences on EPI
selection. Field study research is defined as the examination of a real-world phenomenon
through direct contact with managers (Ahrens and Dent 1998; Yin 2003). The objective is
to obtain a rich and real understanding of a relevant business matter (Merchant and Van
der Stede 2006). Our focus of interest is the way multiple stakeholders can influence a
firm's choice of EPI. Understanding how firms are affected by stakeholders in their
choices requires an in-depth analysis of the business context (Creswell 1998; Eisenhardt
1989). Also, Leonard-Barton (1990) argues that a case study approach is appropriate
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when little knowledge is available on a subject, as is the case for the selection of internal
EPI. Finally, prior research shows that qualitative case studies are relevant in the
investigation of environmental issues (e.g. Herbohn 2005; Deegan and Blomquist 2006;
Hendry 2005).
2.4.1. Case selection
In order to investigate an information-rich case (Patton 2002), the selection of the case
firm was based on industry conditions and environmental strategy criteria. First, the case
firm has to operate in an environmentally sensitive industry, requiring it to manage its
environmental performance due to the important environmental impacts of its activities.
Applying this criterion allows for the selection of a firm that strongly exhibits this focus
of interest (Patton 2002) and can help in the collection of detailed information on the role
of stakeholders regarding the choice of internal EPI. Second, the case firm has to pursue a
proactive environmental strategy because the more proactive it is, the broader the range
of stakeholders it perceives as important (Buysse and Verbeke 2003; Henriques and
Sadorsky 1999). Therefore, we can gain more insight by investigating an
environmentally proactive firm owing to the greater array of stakeholder groups and the
variety of stakeholder influences. As a result, the selection of the research site is based on
two criteria: 1) the firm must operate in an environmentally sensitive industry; 2) the firm
must demonstrate a proactive environmental strategy. The selected firm is a large
multinational with operations on all continents in the natural resources industry. It is
publicly listed and is a component of various sustainability stock indices. Focusing on a
single firm provided an in-depth understanding of its business context.
59
2.4.2. Information collection
Information was collected from interviews and from an examination of corporate
documents. A request was made to interview the individuals responsible for the selection
and monitoring of EPI. Interviews were conducted with executives from the Vice-
President - Environment team at the worldwide headquarters of the case firm. These
executives are in charge of managing the global environmental responsibility of the
organization. The selection, enforcement and monitoring of EPI at the highest level of the
organization are among their main responsibilities. Semi-structured interviews averaging
75 minutes were conducted with (1) the Environmental Manager, (2) the Environmental
Director and (3) the Environmental, Health & Security Performance Data Manager.
These respondents represent a key, information-rich source regarding the focus of our
study because of their day-to-day involvement with the firm's internal EPI (Patton 2002).
The interview guide is presented in Appendix 3. All interviews were recorded and
transcribed. Several corporate documents were also thoroughly examined: (1) the internal
Manual of Environmental Strategy, (2) the Environmental Indicators Guideline, (3) an
internal presentation on the firm's corporate sustainability issues, (4) the last annual
report and (5) publicly available reports on sustainability matters. Corroboration of
interviewee information using corporate documents allowed us to triangulate information
collected (Yin 2003). In addition, a multi-method multiple respondent approach reduces
the threat of response bias (Kren 1997; Abernethy and LiIHs 2001).
2.4.3. The research site
The case firm is a world leader in its industry sector and it applies a proactive
environmental strategy. Firms adopting this type of strategy strive to be environmental
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leaders by aiming for environmental excellence (Hunt and Auster 1990). Buysse and
Verbeke (2003) assert that proactive firms integrate environmental issues into their
strategic planning, invest in green manufacturing processes, and employ elaborated
environmental management systems. These proactive environmental firms also benefit
from the commitment of top management (Hunt and Auster 1990). The case firm's
conformity to these characteristics was established during the case selection process and
then confirmed during interviews:
"Environmental issues are parts of big projects... We have the best
[environmental] practices with existing technologies ...Key [environmental]
indicators are established, followed, explained and analyzed, all of that
within a well-defined framework... There is a commitment from top
management towards [environmental emission] reduction "
Excerpts from interviews substantiate the case firm's commitment to a proactive
environmental strategy. Its goal of environmental excellence is not only supported by top
management's high level of involvement, but also by an integrated environmental
management process. The case firm includes strategic environmental issues in its
corporate strategic planning. Interviewees indicated that the firm uses an elaborate
management system that allows managers to monitor environmental issues; EPI are
established, followed, explained and analyzed. The examination of internal corporate
documents confirms the proactive environmental strategy of the case firm.
2.4.4. Information analysis
The information collected was imported in the Atlas.ti software (Atlas.ti 2004). The
software was employed to organize the data and to provide a structure to data analysis.
Coding and further analyses were performed by the researcher. The approach used to
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analyze the collected information is based on Kisfalvi (2000) and Langley (1999). Codes
were generated from interview transcripts and the reviewed corporate documents. After
the initial coding, all codes were reviewed to verify the reliability of the coding. Any
inconsistency was investigated and adjusted if necessary. A final review of all codes then
followed to further ensure coding reliability. Codes and their associated quotations were
then grouped into main categories according to common themes. Three major code
categories emerged: environmental strategy, EPI and important stakeholders. The
information from each category was analyzed using a within-category analysis method to
identify trends and to summarize each main theme. Next, categories were compared using
a cross-category analysis method in order to identify potential interrelations between
environmental strategy, EPI and important stakeholders. To perform cross-category
analysis, each category was compared with the two remaining categories using a matrix.
This first analysis resulted in 2X2 interrelations and was followed by a simultaneous
comparison of the three matrices, intended to study interrelations between these three
categories concurrently, and to make sure that all potential interrelations were considered.
2.5. Evidence from the case study
2.5.1. Environmental strategy and internal environmental performance indicators
Before presenting the various relationships between important stakeholders and EPI, we
examine the association between the case firm's environmental strategy and internal EPI.
2.5.1.1. The role of environmental strategy
Excerpts from interviews highlight the first type of association between environmental
strategy and internal EPI. They indicate a direct relationship where environmental
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strategy influences the choice of EPI. The firm's strategic orientation, specific to its
business activities, has an affect on its choices of environmental measures.
"Sometimes, we don 't have regulation here but we make sure to respect some
voluntary standards. We want to be an environmental world leader, so we
measure EPI even if it is not asked"... "The environmental impact of our
different industrial processes yields the issues we manage" ... "EPI are set up
due to our environmental impacts "
These excerpts from interviews show how a proactive orientation leads the case firm to
have a broader range of internal EPI than regulation requires, and how the array of EPI
employed is based on the firm's strategy. Indeed, the quotes highlight the influence the
strategy has on EPI. First, they explain the content of the environmental strategy (issues
managed because of their related environmental impacts), and how EPI are implemented
based on this content, i.e., the impacts. Therefore, internal EPI are developed based on
the environmental issues the firm wants to document. For example, during interviews,
pollution (in its multiple forms) was mentioned by interviewees twenty times as a
motivation for measuring this environmental strategy component, which was one of the
most frequently cited items. The above evidence stresses the role environmental strategy
plays in the choice of EPI.
2.5.1.2. The role of internal environmental performance indicators (EPI)
The second association works in the opposite direction, where internal EPI affect
environmental strategy. Specifically, the environmental performance evaluation
accomplished through EPI analysis affects the environmental strategy and indicates areas
that require remediation. The relationship between internal EPI and environmental
strategy is documented in the case firm's Manual ofEnvironmental Strategy, where the
utilization of leading environmental indicators is emphasized as a way to accomplish
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environmental objectives. The Manual underlines how internal EPI play an important
role in benchmarking vis-à-vis the competition, and in the evaluation of improvements
related to the firm's environmental strategy objectives. This association between EPI and
the firm's environmental approach has also been mentioned by the interviewees:
"You build a strategy, you apply it (...) so you need
indicators" ... "Perfluorocarbons, which are included in greenhouse gas and
in other indicators, allow us to see how it is actually going and if we notice
difficulties, we will work on (...) technologies or raw materials to see what we
can do "
The monitoring role of internal EPI regarding the environmental strategy is clear: internal
EPI are utilized to follow the environmental strategy and "to see how it is actually
going." The quotes underline how problematic EPI results lead to remediation actions,
such as the review of manufacturing processes, technologies and raw materials sourcing.
These processes are important elements of a proactive environmental strategy. Evidence
from interviews and corporate documents suggest that EPI influence environmental
strategy via the performance evaluation process.
2. 5. 1. 3. Interrelations between environmental strategy and internal EPI
Characteristics of the relationship between environmental strategy and EPI are presented
in Figure 4. Internal EPI are first selected and implemented based on the key aspects of
the firm's environmental strategy. This concurs with the strategic performance
measurement literature, which suggests that organizational strategy influences the choice
of performance measures (Ittner et al. 2003; Chenhall 2003). Next, internal EPI are used
to evaluate the success of the firm's environmental strategy, and to suggest improvements
to certain aspects of the strategy, if required. Required improvements are incorporated
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into a revised strategy where the list of EPI is re-examined, and then the cycle starts over.
This second type of association is consistent with an interactive approach between the
intended strategy (formal plans formulated by corporate managers) and the realized
strategy (the current one observed), which leads to an emergent strategy with the firm's
business context dictating certain patterns of action, and where the strategy is revisited
(Mintzberg 1978; Mintzberg and Waters 1985; Mintzberg 1999). The comparison of
results achieved on EPI versus targets is one of these patterns. These interrelations
between environmental strategy and EPI, described by one interviewee as an "ongoing
improvement process" are illustrated by the arrows in Figure 4. In this figure, the
'performance evaluation' rectangle is included in the ??G rectangle to emphasize the
specific, but not exclusive, use of these indicators for performance evaluation. This
analysis is useful to understand the role of stakeholders in reference to EPI choice to
which we now turn.







2.5.2. How stakeholders influence the case firm in its choice of internal EPI
Based on the interviews and collected information, we identify four ways in which
stakeholders influence the case firm's choice of internal EPI and environmental strategy.
Each of the four is explained below.
2.5.2.1. Mediated influence through environmental strategy
The first way stakeholders influence the choice of internal EPI is through the firm's
environmental strategy. As reported in interviews, stakeholders can influence aspects of
environmental strategy without having a direct effect on internal EPI. Because
environmental strategy influences internal EPI, stakeholders that exert pressure on the
case firm concerning its environmental strategy indirectly influence its choice of EPI.
The following are quotes from interviewees about the influence of clients and creditors
on environmental strategy:
(about Clients) "They ask that we be certified ISO 14001 ...Some clients asked
us to have management systems to ensure environmental quality... So we had
to make sure to obtain this [ISO] certification. Some clients are interested in
the LCA [Life Cycle Analysis] approach to manage our products (...) It is a
driverfor us "
(about Creditors) "They want to know ifthefirm has good management systems
in place... They ask morefor action plans thanfor specific measures "
12The role of stakeholders regarding internal EPI was raised in two ways during the interviews. In some
cases, interviewees spontaneously introduced stakeholder issues during the discussions, while in other
cases, stakeholders' roles were addressed directly through specific interview questions.
13 ISO 14001 is an environmental management system, i.e., "the part of the overall management system that
includes organizational structure, planning activities, responsibilities, practices, procedures, processes
and resources for developing, implementing, achieving, reviewing and maintaining the environmental
policy" (ISO 1999, p. 2). Life cycle analysis (LCA) is the assessment of the environmental impacts of a
firm's product from "the cradle to the grave," i.e., from the extraction of the natural resources to the
disposal of the product after usage (Gauthier 2005).
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These quotes illustrate that clients and creditors make requests to the case firm regarding
environmental management systems, a key component of a proactive environmental
strategy. Their requests range from specific subsystems, such as life cycle analysis, to the
overall effectiveness of the management processes, such as good management systems to
ensure environmental quality. Clients even ask for external acknowledgment of the
system's quality via the International Standard Organization (ISO). The case firm
recognizes clients' influence because it responds to these demands: "we had to make
sure to obtain this certification." As one interviewee stated, "All plants must be certified
ISO 14001. New plants have two years to obtain it. ..plants that are more than two years
old are all certified." However, interviewees do not recognize any direct influence on
clients and creditors with respect to internal EPI selection. Therefore, clients and
creditors seem to influence the case firm only at the environmental strategy level.
Accordingly, clients and creditor stakeholders have a mediated influence on internal EPI
choice through their impact on environmental strategy.
2.5.2.2. Direct and indirect influence
Stakeholders may also simultaneously influence the case firm's choice of internal EPI at
the strategic and environmental performance measurement levels. The following are
quotes from the case firm's interviewees about the influence of investors and investor
representatives14 on environmental strategy and EPI:
(Investors on strategy) ''During annual shareholder meetings, there is an
increasing number of questions asked on environmental issues... People vote
[on these issues] and it ends up influencing (...) actions, strategies and other
l4The case firm's environmental performance is frequently assessed by evaluation firms for the purpose of
sustainability stock indices. These evaluation firms, referred to here as investor representatives, are a
significant stakeholder group for the corporation.
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things that will be implemented. ..Investors want to know how we manage
greenhouse gases "
(Investors on EPI) "Regarding certain aspects, they ask to have more
measures. The biodiversity aspect is one of those... It is very important to have
EPl to answer their questioning"
(Investor representatives on strategy) "Stock listing evaluation firms from
sustainability indices assess us by sending surveys, and we later know our
performance. This isfor sure an incentive"
(Investor representatives on EPI) "Yes, we look at what the surveys demand.
We evaluate their demands: Are we able to answer or not? Is it goodfor us to
answer or not? How can we answer. ..It is the external demands (...) of [stock
listing evaluation firms] that analyse the firm's sustainable
performance... Some [stock] indices do that: they take our report and divide
our numbers by our sales, so we do that too "
Investors and their representatives employ particular events and criteria, such as annual
shareholder meetings and sustainability index surveys, to communicate environmental
concerns to the case firm. These concerns are mentioned to have an effect on its
environmental strategy. These stakeholders also request the adoption of specific EPI,
such as biodiversity measures that have been recently implemented by the case firm.
Quotes suggest that from the investors' perspective, firms remain responsible for
developing and providing EPI to address any questions investors may have. Similarly,
demands from investor representatives are weighted heavily, as illustrated by the critical
range of questions following sustainability indices' surveys: "Are we able to answer or
not? Is it good for us to answer or not? How can we answer?"
Therefore, investors and their representatives influence the case firm's choice of internal
EPI, both indirectly and directly; the first type of influence uses environmental strategy to
68
attain the desired effect, while the second addresses matters involving EPI in a more
straightforward manner.
2. 5. 2. 3. Joint effort
When considering green stakeholders, the case firm is not only affected by direct and
indirect influences, but also by company-stakeholder interaction. A particular relationship
seems to emerge, one that is a catalyst for cooperation between the firm and its
stakeholders in a joint effort to achieve common environmental goals. Stakeholders with
whom the case firm engages in initiatives in a cooperative spirit are governments, the
community and employees. The following are quotes by interviewees from the case firm
about the influence of these stakeholders on the environmental strategy and EPI:
(about Governments on strategy) "The respect of norms and regulations is at
the core of our environmental strategy. We don't want to be in non
compliance, and we must go beyond"
(about Governments on EPl) "They can ask certain measures, they can impose
measures. ..For water, the government determined on what we must comply"
(about Community on strategy) "It [their influence] makes us try to have a
proactive approach "
(about Community on EPI) "There have been perceptions of communities
surrounding certain plants, which were saying that particulate materials may
cause, well, certain damages... Ifa neighbour wants the plant to measure noise
because he/she thinks it is important, the plant must measure noise"
(about Employees on strategy) "There has been a worhhop in which plant
supervisors or key persons in plants were directly participating (...) to validate
the [environmental strategic] planning "
(about Employees on EPI) "Employees can encourage the introduction of
certain [environmental] measures... Yes. They can have [this influence] at the
plant level "
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The influence all three stakeholder groups have on the case firm's environmental strategy
is explicit. While governmental regulation sets the basis for the firm's environmental
strategy ("regulation is at the core",), the community alone constitutes a significant
motivation for the firm to further its strategic development by adopting a proactive
environmental approach. Regarding employees' contribution to environmental strategy,
their participation in strategic environmental planning highlights their importance.
Furthermore, stakeholder groups have a direct impact on the choice of internal EPI:
governments influence environmental measurement through regulation as they "ask,"
"impose" and "determine" specific indicators; the community motivates the addition of
internal EPI through its concerns, i.e., "particulate materials may cause certain damages"
or "important noise"; employees suggest the implementation of internal EPI at the plant
level.
Of interest is the spirit behind the stakeholders' influences that emerges from the
interviews. There is a clear recognition of each stakeholder group's influences. The
following are quotes related to evidence of a joint effort:
(Joint effort with Governments) "we work in partnership, instead of one
monitors the other. So this is important, I think, we work with the same
objective: improvement... Of course, it is a corporate point of view versus a
governmental point of view, but I think they know we don 't want to generate
waste or emissions and we try to help them "
(Joint effort with Community) "it does not necessarily come from complaints.
It is more in the course of working, a joint work, in a spirit of mutual
progress... We are partners with the neighbouring community"
(Joint effort with Employees) "with our environmental strategy, we think it is
not only management; it is a mindset for employees. We are all responsible to
manage, we need everyone to manage"
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These comments show that relationships between the firm and its stakeholders are
associated with cooperation because "joint work in the spirit of mutual progress" is
accomplished by sharing the same "mindset" and working "with the same objective."
Terms employed within these descriptions fall under the definition of partnership or joint
effort. The existence of such a partnership between the case firm and these stakeholders
has also been observed when we examined the Manual of Environmental Strategy and
Reports on Sustainability Matters. In summary, the stakeholders' direct and indirect
influence over EPI choice can evolve into a joint effort.
2. 5. 2. 4. Environmental benchmarking
The last way stakeholders can influence the case firm's EPI choice is through
benchmarking, when environmental performance evaluations are performed by the firm
with the help of its industry associations. This gives the firm a way to evaluate its
environmental performance with its peers.15 The following are quotes by interviewees
from the case firm about the influence of industry associations on environmental strategy
and EPI:
"Associations will set [environmental] objectives, either voluntary or
mandatory, and this is a driver for us... We are a member, so if we decide to
follow [the association 's new objectives] and to set a target, we will make sure
to implement the indicator if it does not exist. ..Through the association, we
were always coming across (...) some (environmental) measures, but we did
not have these measures. We added them "
Based on these quotes, environmental decisions made by industry associations are
presented as drivers of environmental strategy. The influence these associations exert
l5These industrial stakeholders are different from the stock listing evaluation firms (investor
representatives) presented earlier because the former give the firm the means to evaluate its performance
by itself, while the latter conduct an independent performance evaluation of the firm.
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over internal EPI is stated through the case firm's membership status. Indeed, the
member firm will implement the necessary EPI following its decision to adopt a
voluntary recommendation by its industry association.
The collaborative spirit described in the previous section also exists in the firm-
stakeholder relationship, as indicated by the following quotes:
"Lot of things are developed at the association level... We work together a lot
and we try to have the same measures and the same ways to measure... We are
in partnership with many associations [regarding environmental matters] "
In addition to the above ways industry influences the case firm in its choice of internal
EPI, industry-level information on environmental issues is provided to the firm by the
associations. As indicated by the following quotes, this information offers the firm an
opportunity to evaluate its environmental performance relative to other members of the
industry:
"We give our data to certain sub-industrial associations or industrial
associations, which perform studies or analyses that they return to us in an
anonymous format. Then we are able to see where we are situated within the
industry [in terms of environmental performance... If we are not leaders, we
conclude that, since we employ a similar technology, we are definitely able to
improve ourperformance... and actions will be taken "
It has been previously mentioned that EPI represent a way to monitor the successful
implementation of the environmental strategy and to make sure that, when necessary, the
required remediation is undertaken. Accordingly, the case firm faces additional
stakeholder influence when receiving industry environmental performance information to
conduct benchmarking. Due to its environmental world leadership objective, this
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information stimulates the case firm to improve its performance through the adaptation of
its strategy and choice of EPI.
2.6. Corroboration of interviews with information obtained from stakeholders
We corroborate with stakeholder-derived information the results of the interviews and
corporate documents regarding stakeholder influence on EPI. Reports obtained from
websites are examined for clients, creditors, governments and industry associations. For
creditors, we also examine the annual reports of all major banks (Canadian, American,
and European). Information on the community and employees is sought in national and
local newspapers from the ABI Inform and Eureka databases. Finally, we find
information on investors and their representatives in the Corporate Social Investment
Database from Jantzi Research, used here as a proxy for the investment perspective.
This section presents the findings of our analysis of stakeholders' documents in support
of their influence on the case firm's environmental strategy and internal EPI choice.
2.6.1. Mediated influence by the clients and creditors
The mediated influence of stakeholders on internal EPI occurs through an impact on
environmental strategy. Through industry association bulletins, we found that the case
firm signed a long-term contract to supply a major airplane manufacturer. The latter, a
client of the case firm, published a report entitled Environmental Requirements for
Suppliers stating that both the manufacturer and its suppliers must implement an ISO
14001 compliant environmental management system to minimize environmental risks.
I6The Corporate Social Investment Database provides interested investors with detailed reports and related
industry rankings and scores on the social, environmental and governance performance of hundreds of
publicly traded firms (Jantzi Research 2008). Jantzi Research is the Canadian counterpart of the U.S.-
based KLD (KLD 2009a) frequently used in management and accounting research.
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The manufacturer's purchasing department is required to consider environmental criteria
in the selection of suppliers. Similarly, industry association bulletins also indicate that
the case firm supplies major car manufacturers, and an examination of these
manufacturers' websites shows that they all require their suppliers to have an
environmental management system in place and comply with a life cycle analysis
approach. For example, a car manufacturer's sustainability report emphasizes the special
attention required for the selection of materials from suppliers and how management
teams from the manufacturer and suppliers must meet and reach a partnership agreement
on environmentally compatible production processes.
In summary, the interviews corroborate the clients' documents related to the clients'
influence on the case firm's environmental strategy. Clients ask their supplier, the case
firm, to have an environmental management system in place and to comply with a life
cycle analysis approach, which is a form of mediated influence in the continuum of
stakeholders' influences. Nonetheless, we do not find documents directly supporting the
interviews' results for creditors. This outcome is not surprising since banks are very
reluctant to disclose any information about their customers, be it sensitive or not.
Confidentiality and privacy are bank trademarks. However, the importance of respecting
environmental regulations, as mentioned in the general loan policies of the case firm's
bank, hints at an influence on environmental strategy.
2.6.2. Direct and indirect influence by investors and their representatives
Direct and indirect influence suggests that investors and their representatives exert
pressure on both environmental strategy and EPI selection. One way investors influence
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the case firm's environmental strategy is through shareholder proposals on environmental
issues during annual meetings. Jantzi Research reports reveal that ethical funds submitted
proposals to have the case firm endorse principles on environmental practices. Similarly,
newspapers report that investors asked the case firm to improve their community
consultation process on environmental issues.
Jantzi Research surveys firms and provides scores on their environmental performance; it
is considered an investor representative. Its survey allots significant attention to
environmental performance measurement and monitoring, and lists the internal EPI the
case firm measures. Given that the environmental score Jantzi Research attributes to the
ease firm depends, in part, on its results on environmental performance measurement, the
emphasis Jantzi Research places on this issue is a form of influence on the case firm's
EPI choice. Further evidence of investor representatives' influence on EPI is the fact that
both Jantzi Research and the case firm use the same environmental metric. Therefore,
documents from investors and their representatives suggest influence on the case firm's
environmental strategy and choice of internal EPI. These influences form the direct and
indirect pattern used by these stakeholders.
2.6.3. Joint effort influence of government, the community and employees
Stakeholders exert a joint effort influence over internal EPI when their direct and indirect
influence evolves into a partnership. Evidence of collaboration between the case firm and
the Ministry of the Environment are available on government websites. The parties agree
on "memorandums of understanding" to work jointly to develop and implement pollution
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prevention plans, cooperate with local governments and the community, and develop and
monitor internal EPI.
Newspaper analysis reports that the community puts pressure on the case firm to find an
environmentally friendly way to transform toxic waste, which leads to several public
consultations. Newspapers report that a community representative praises the case firm as
an "exemplary corporate citizen" on this issue, which leads to the firm's receiving an
environmental award presented by the local media.
The joint effort taking place between the case firm and its employees is presented as a
shared mindset. Newspapers report how the case firm works to raise the awareness of
environmental issues among its managers in developing countries, and how it promotes
environmental protection among employees by means of financial incentives for
greenhouse gas reduction. The press emphasizes that these initiatives, aimed at building
a shared environmental mindset between the case firm and its employees, result in
increased motivation and greater employee participation in the improvement of
environmental performance. In short, documentation reveals that the case firm is
involved in pollution prevention with governments, cooperation with communities, and
the sharing of environmental responsibilities among employees. This evidence suggests a
joint effort influence by these stakeholders.
2.6.4. Environmental benchmarking influence of the industry and associations
Benchmarking influence takes place when stakeholders working in joint effort with the
firm enable it to benchmark its environmental performance. Industry association
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newsletters indicate that the case firm, and major firms in its industry, take a voluntary
approach with the government to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. They negotiated an
agreement where specific EPI are defined, measured, targeted, monitored and audited by
an independent third party. The influence of the industry on environmental strategy and
EPI is evident; the case firm actively participates to achieve the industry association's
objectives by developing and implementing the same EPI. The case firm provides its data
to its industry association, and receives aggregate information for the whole industry,
which permits the firm to assess where it is situated with respect to its peers in terms of
environmental performance. Reports in a newsletter indicate that for more than 1 5 years
the industry association has systematically performed environmental benchmarking
regarding the measurement and monitoring of EPI. Each indicator is measured annually
and the results are sent to an international institute, which then provides a report allowing
each firm to measure its performance relative to that of other industry members. This
institute also establishes environmental objectives for reduction in PFC emissions, energy
use, consumption of water, and the implementation of environmental management
systems.
In summary, available documentation supports the interview results on the environmental
benchmarking influence. Working with its industry associations to develop a common
environmental strategy and EPI allows the case firm to use benchmarks to measure itself
against its peers in terms of environmental performance.
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2.7. Description of a continuum of stakeholders' influences over EPI choice,
theoretical perspectives
Our findings are summarized in Figure 5, which shows that stakeholders influence the
case firm in various ways regarding its choice of internal EPI. These influences evolve
along a continuum, beginning with a narrow, one-way influence, and progressing toward
a broad, interactive influence. First, stakeholders influence the case firm via their impact
on environmental strategy, which constitutes a mediated influence on EPI choice.
Second, in addition to this indirect influence, the case firm also experiences direct
stakeholder influence when it receives explicit pressures from stakeholders concerning
which EPI it chooses to manage environmental performance. Third, stakeholders' direct
and indirect influence can evolve into a joint effort where stakeholders and the firm
interact with the objective of achieving a common environmental goal. In Figure 5, the
bidirectional arrows linking the two groups appearing on the continuum illustrate this
interaction between stakeholders and the firm. Finally, the influence of this relationship
broadens when stakeholders provide the case firm with a way to evaluate its
environmental performance; in this environmental benchmarking influence, the case firm
































Each pattern illustrated along the continuum of stakeholders' influence over EPI choice
can be associated with prior research, even though this type of continuum does not exist
in the literature. For example, the mediated influence and the direct and indirect influence
are consistent with Atkinson et al. (1997) regarding stakeholders' influence on
organizational strategy. These authors assert that the contributions and expectations of
important stakeholders form the basis upon which strategy should be developed, and
performance measures associated with the strategy should address stakeholders'
expectations. The joint effort influence appears to be the convergence of green
stakeholders' influence on corporations (e.g. Hendry 2005; Henriques and Sharma 2005;
Frooman 1 999) and stakeholder management approaches to deal with green stakeholders
(e.g. Knox et al. 2005; Unerman and Bennett 2004; Harvey and Schaefer 2001). This
convergence guides the work of the firm and its stakeholders toward a common
environmental objective. Next, the environmental benchmarking influence recognizes the
role of stakeholders in environmental performance, and is consistent with Kassinis and
Vafeas (2006). Finally, the continuum of stakeholders' influence meshes with the
environmental strategy continuum where firms can evolve from a reactive to a proactive
approach (Hunt and Auster 1990).
2.7.1. Theoretical interpretation
Theories can be used to reinforce the external validity of a single case study (Yin 2003).
In this context, stakeholder and legitimacy theories are the underlying foundations of the
continuum of stakeholders' influences. Stakeholder theory is the most apparent
theoretical explanation underlying the study. This theory stipulates that groups with
different interests and concerns regarding corporate actions evolve around a firm with the
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ability to have an impact on its activities (Clarkson 1995). A firm's management must
address stakeholder expectations by simultaneously paying attention to all relevant
stakeholders (Freeman 1984; Donaldson and Preston 1995; Rowley 1997). Because the
environment is becoming increasingly important for numerous stakeholders (e.g. Harvey
and Schaefer 2001), firms must consider their environmental expectations in order to
meet their demands.
Support for stakeholder theory is found throughout our analysis. Each form of influence
on environmental strategy or internal EPI that causes the case firm to adapt its
environmental approach and EPI choice illustrates how a firm may address stakeholders'
environmental expectations. Stakeholder theory also explains one of the driving forces of
the continuum: the importance for stakeholders of corporate environmental impacts. As
we move along the continuum, the environmental impacts of the case firm's activities
become more and more important for the respective stakeholder groups. These
environmental impacts matter least of all to clients and creditors (business stakeholders)
unless they begin to interfere with their contracts with the case firm (Cormier et al. 2004).
Therefore, their influence over the firm's environmental management can be limited to a
mediated influence. Investors and their representatives (financial stakeholders) consider
the environmental impacts of the firm's activities to be more important, because they can
affect the value of their investment (Cormier and Magnan 1997; Hassel et al. 2005).
Their investment implicitly requires environmental management, which they monitor
through their direct and indirect influence. Next, the necessity for governments,
communities and employees (social stakeholders) to exert a joint effort influence arises
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from their greater sensitivity to the firm's environmental impacts; being closer to the
firm's activities, they experience the externalities associated with the case firm more
deeply. Finally, the firm's environmental impact is of utmost importance to its industry,
because these externalities bear potentially significant consequences for the image and
reputation of the industry sector as a whole (e.g. Hoffman 1999), which leads this
stakeholder group to apply a benchmarking influence. Overall, this driving force of the
continuum is consistent with the strategic performance measurement systems literature
where firms monitor performance in light of stakeholders' requirements (Henri 2006).
We can also interpret the continuum of stakeholders' influences over EPI choice from a
societal perspective using legitimacy theory. The case firm engages in actions on
environmental matters to preserve its legitimacy with respect to society (Patten 2005).
Elements of legitimacy such as "public image," "reputation," "visibility," "long-term
license to operate" and "future acceptability" are frequently mentioned throughout the
interviews and the corporate documents examined, as presented in Table 8. Concepts
such as "public image," "reputation" and "visibility" emphasize the importance of
society's perceptions of the case firm, while "license to operate" and "acceptability" refer
to the case firm's survival. Given the importance society places on environmental issues,
maintaining legitimacy is a significant reason to consider stakeholders' environmental
demands (Deegan and Blomquist 2006; Cormier et al. 2004). For example, investor
representatives are regarded as very influential stakeholders because of their impact on
public image. The importance of these stakeholders is documented by one interviewee:
"Reputation has an intangible value. ..we have a long-term license to operate and we
82
want to preserve it, so we must have a good reputation.'''' Similarly, reports on
sustainability underline the importance of the community from a legitimacy perspective
by linking current and future access to natural resources with community trust.
Addressing stakeholder demands seems to be a way for the case firm to adapt its
operating methods to secure its future (Dowling and Pfeffer 1975).
Given the case firm's awareness of stakeholders' environmental concerns, preserving
legitimacy also appears to motivate the adoption of a proactive environmental strategy.
For example, reports on sustainability matters show that proactive water and land
management is often associated with reputation enhancement and preservation of the
firm's long-term license to operate. Similarly, when questioning turned to the motivation
behind proactive water management, one interviewee insisted that the case firm had good
management in place to continue to benefit from the right to access and utilize water. In
addition, reports on sustainability matters also relate the future acceptability of the case
firm's products and activities to the outcomes associated with its management of crucial
environmental issues. Collectively, the examination of corporate documents, interviews
and information obtained directly from stakeholders suggests that the case firm associates
the future of its activities with its environmental strategy. Therefore, pursuing a proactive
environmental strategy represents one way in which the case firm adapts its objectives























































































































































Legitimacy is the second driving force of the continuum of stakeholders' influences over
EPI choice. We contend that the case firm's legitimacy needs increase as we move along
the continuum. This need for legitimacy is related to the importance of the environmental
impact for the respective stakeholders (the first driver of the continuum). The
environmental legitimacy need is at a minimum with clients and creditors that view the
firm as mostly legitimate when it fulfills its contracts with them within reasonable
environmental boundaries. This is represented by a mediated influence. The direct and
indirect influence exerted by investors and their representatives suggests a greater need
for environmental legitimacy for these groups because the firm wants to retain its current
investors and attract future financing (Henriques and Sadorsky 1999). The firm's
legitimacy need increases with respect to governments, communities and employees.
Through the joint influence, the firm works in conjunction with these stakeholders that
are directly affected by its externalities to legitimize its activities in their minds (Kapelus
2002). Finally, the case firm's need for environmental legitimacy peaks at the industrial
stakeholder level. The firm recognizes the industry's benchmarking influence, and
complies with and exceeds industry standards. It thus uses the benchmarking results as a
legitimizing tool. Overall, this driving force behind the continuum is consistent with the
strategic performance measurement systems literature's being employed to legitimize
actions (Henri, 2006).
2.8. Concluding comments
The objective of this paper was to conduct an exploratory investigation of the role
stakeholders play in the selection of EPI. Adopting a field study approach, both
stakeholder theory and legitimacy theory are drawn upon to analyze managers'
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interviews, corporate documents, and information obtained directly from stakeholders.
We highlight stakeholders' influences over the case firm in its choice of EPI. These
influences are represented by a continuum with a narrow unidirectional influence at one
end, and a broad bidirectional influence at the other end. Results demonstrate stakeholder
and societal influences on environmental management and performance measurement.
This paper contributes to the understanding of the stakeholders' role in shaping a firm's
behavior toward the environment. It takes into consideration internal EPI, whereas prior
research concentrated mainly on environmental concerns, strategy and external
disclosure.
This study is subject to limitations. Focusing on a single firm has allowed an in-depth
understanding of the firm's business context regarding environmental indicators; it also
limits the generalizability of the results. While stakeholders can influence the selection of
EPl through other means, they were not uncovered during our investigation. Future
research could examine the communication strategies a firm adopts in order to shape
stakeholders' influences over its environmental performance evaluations. The absence of
certain stakeholders from the continuum developed could also be explored. For example,
requests made by environmental non-governmental organizations (ENGOs) are widely
publicized in the media, and supply chain issues are increasingly considered essential
parts of corporate environmental management. However, our investigation suggests
neither ENGOs nor suppliers seem to fall within the scope of the continuum. This issue
will therefore require further investigation.
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Chapter 3: Contrasting realities: corporate
environmental disclosure and stakeholder-released
information
Abstract
This paper studies the informational dynamics taking place between a firm and its
stakeholders with respect to corporate environmental management. These dynamics refer
to the way in which constituents (the firm and its stakeholders) release environmental
information, react to the releases from the other constituent and affect each other in their
disclosure (adapted from Buhr 2007). The analysis rests on a longitudinal case study
contrasting environmental information reported by the case firm with environmental
information about the firm disclosed by four key stakeholder groups or their
representatives (governments, community, environmental non-governmental
organizations and investors) over a period of three years. These environmental
disclosures have been analysed and compared to identify the similarities, differences,
overlaps and omissions of corporate reporting vis-à-vis stakeholder-released information.
The case firm under study is a large international corporation operating in the forest and
paper products industry throughout North America and the United Kingdom. Results
suggest the presence of a gap composed of different patterns between corporate and
stakeholder environmental disclosures. The patterns range from uniformity between
corporate and stakeholder disclosures to performance-neutral and performance-biased
gaps, with stakeholders complementing or contradicting corporate disclosures. The
relativism arising between the environmental ethics of the case firm and that of its
stakeholders is employed to interpret findings and assess the accountability of the case
firm. Specifically, the differences in the environmental values of the case firm and those
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of its stakeholders explain the gap between the information reported by the perspectives
because different environmental values call for different environmental disclosures. In
addition, the more intense the ethical relativism between the firm and its stakeholders for




Developing an understanding of corporate environmental management and performance
can be compared to looking through the different facets of a prism. One facet advocates
that good environmental performance creates value for the corporation (Hart 1995; Russo
and Fouts 1997; Al-Tuwaijri et al. 2004). Another facet of the prism proposes that greater
environmental disclosure is used to mask poor environmental performance (Hughes et al.
2001; Patten 2002) while a third one argues the opposite, i.e. that superior environmental
disclosure demonstrates better environmental performance (Al-Tuwaijri et al. 2004;
Clarkson et al. 2008). Another facet suggests that stakeholders influence corporate
environmental performance (Sharma and Henriques 2005; Kassinis and Vafeas 2002,
2006) and corporate environmental disclosure (Roberts 1992; Cormier et al. 2004; Adams
and Whelan 2009). Still another facet states that stakeholders are influenced by
environmental performance and disclosure (Deegan and Blomquist 2006; Hendry 2005;
Milne and Patten 2002). All these perspectives depict different aspects of corporate
environmental performance, much like each facet presents a different view of the same
prism. How can we get a sense of the overall picture of a corporation's environmental
management and performance? Adams (2004) and Dey (2007) suggest that this can be
achieved by studying environmental information released by both the firm and by its
stakeholders.
The paper explores informational dynamics taking place between a firm and its
stakeholders with respect to corporate environmental management. These dynamics refer
to the way constituents (the firm and its stakeholders) release environmental information,
how they react to the releases from the other constituent and how their disclosures affect
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each other (adapted from Buhr 2007). The dynamics are analysed through a longitudinal
case study contrasting environmental information reported by the case firm with
environmental information about the firm disclosed by four key stakeholder groups or
their representatives: governments, community, environmental non-governmental
organizations (ENGOs) and investors. The case firm is Abitibi Consolidated, a large
international corporation operating in the forest and paper products industry throughout
North America and the United Kingdom. Information released through corporate
environmental disclosure (annual reports, sustainability reports, web, press releases)
along with the environmental information released by concerned governments,
communities, ENGOs and investors has been collected for the period of 2005 to 2007.
These environmental disclosures have been analysed and compared to identify the
similarities, differences, overlaps and omissions of corporate reporting vis-à-vis
stakeholder-released information.
Economic and socio-political approaches are often employed to study environmental
1 7
disclosure (Berthelot et al. 2003). Ethical approaches, although scantly used so far, are
also of significant relevance for social and environmental accounting (Andrew 2000).
Indeed, corporate environmental management raises important ethical issues, such as the
extent to which it could be considered ethical for a corporation to generate profits while
harming the environmental resources belonging to society (Jeurissen and Keijzers 2004).
I thus adopt an ethical stance to analyze the informational dynamics of Abitibi-
Consolidated and its stakeholders. Specifically, I employ ethical relativism to investigate
the research question. This perspective stipulates that what is considered ethical or
17 See Parker (2005) for a re\'iew of the theories employed in social and environmental accounting research.
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unethical is not objective and changes from one individual, stakeholder or society to
another, and over time (Lewis and Unerman 1999; Wong 1993).
The results suggest a gap between corporate and stakeholder environmental disclosures.
This gap is composed of different patterns ranging from uniformity (the absence of a gap)
in disclosures to performance-neutral and performance-biased gaps between the corporate
and the stakeholder perspectives. Using ethical relativism, I attribute this gap to the
differences in environmental values between the firm and its stakeholders. Indeed, from
this perspective, environmental disclosure is considered to be dedicated to the
demonstration of the fulfilment of environmental values (Richardson 1987). The
relativism of environmental values implies that the information disclosed is likely to be
appropriate for some stakeholders but not for others (Lewis and Unerman 1 999), thereby
explaining the gap existing between corporate environmental disclosure and stakeholder-
released environmental information. In addition, contrasting stakeholder information with
corporate disclosure sheds light on the level of accountability of the corporation (Adams
2004). Complementing the ethical relativism analysis with an accountability appraisal
indicates that the different patterns of disclosure are associated with different levels of
accountability; the more relativism there is in a pattern, the lower the level of
accountability.
Studying the informational dynamics of environmental management is important for the
evolution of corporate environmental disclosure. So far, accounting standard setters
worldwide regulated only the reporting of environmental contingencies, asset retirement
91
obligations and other environmental costs and liabilities.18 By exposing the nuances in
the gap between corporate and non-corporate environmental disclosures, this paper
concretely underlines the extent to which voluntary corporate environmental reporting
meets stakeholders' information and accountability needs (Adams 2004; Unerman and
Bennett 2004). These results will be helpful in assessing the transparency of
environmental information disclosed and the requirements of the information users. They
contribute to the debate on the necessity and usefulness of regulating social and
environmental reporting (see Buhr 2007) by providing standard setters and other
interested parties with relevant information on the consequences of leaving most
decisions about environmental disclosure to the discretion of organizations. The results
may also interest corporate environmental information users as they offer guidance
regarding the adequacy of the given information for decision-making. Similarly, the
results provide companies with insights about how corporate awareness of stakeholders'
environmental values may help them improve their accountability.
This paper contributes to the literature by answering the repeated call for research into the
overall portrayal of corporate social and environmental performance available through
multiple information sources (Thomson and Bebbington 2005; Adams and Harte 1998;
Owen 2008; Unerman 2000; Georgakopoulos and Thomson 2008). In particular, this
study contributes to the environmental accounting literature by offering insights into the
accountability of corporate environmental disclosure from a stakeholder perspective.
This perspective helps break down the gap between corporate and non-corporate
^Internationally: IAS 37 of the International Financial Reporting Standards.
Canada: Sections 3290 and 31 10 of the Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants Handbook.
United States: SFAS 5 and 143.
92
environmental disclosure and helps identify the extent to which the organization is
accountable to its stakeholders. Another contribution of the paper lies within the analysis
of the results in light of the conceptual framework of ethical relativism (Wong 1 993), a
philosophical perspective on which little empirical research has been performed in the
social and environmental accounting literature.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section discusses the background
literature and elaborates on the concept of informational dynamics. The third section
develops the conceptual framework of the study around ethical relativism. The fourth
section introduces the case firm, Abitibi-Consolidated, and details the research design.
The fifth and sixth sections analyze and discuss the results respectively, and the last
section offers concluding comments.
3.2. Background
The last two decades of environmental accounting research witnessed the development of
knowledge about how corporations report on their environmental management and
performance around three main streams of literature (Berthelot et al. 2003). The first
stream examines the determinants of voluntary environmental disclosure (Aerts et al.
2006; Neu et al. 1998; Roberts 1992; Gray et al. 1995; Deegan 2002; Cormier and
Magnan 2003; Islam and Deegan 2008; Belai and Owen 2007) while the second studies
the value relevance of environmental accounting information (Blacconiere and Patten
1994; Cormier and Magnan 1997; Li and McConomy 1999; Richardson and Welker
2001; Clarkson et al. 2004; Johnston 2005).
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The last stream of literature, the one most closely related to this study, analyzes the
reliability of reported environmental information. A number of studies in this stream
investigate whether environmental performance is adequately reflected in environmental
disclosure (Al-Tuwaijri et al. 2004; Clarkson et al. 2008; Patten 2002). Another
substream, to which this study contributes, examines reliability by assessing the
substance of environmental disclosure. Substance has been evaluated through the
appraisal of compliance with mandatory reporting standards (Freedman and Stagliano
1995; Alciatore et al. 2004), comparisons of corporate policies with subsequent
disclosures (Patten 2005; Tilt 2001), the analysis of the nature of disclosure (Deegan and
Gordon 1996; Deegan and Rankin 1996; Deegan et al. 2002) and the degree of
compliance with voluntary social and environmental disclosure guidelines such as
AccountAbility 1000 (ISEA 1999) and the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI 2006) (Belai
2002; Guenther et al. 2006; Morhardt et al. 2002; Moerman and Van Der Laan 2005;
Adams 2004; Ruffing 2007).
These perspectives adopted to examine substance unanimously assert the presence of a
gap in corporate environmental reporting. However, in most instances, only specific
pieces of information were examined (Alciatore et al. 2004; Freedman and Stagliano
1995; Patten 2005; Tilt 2001) or only a general appraisal of the content of a reporting
medium (usually the annual report) was conducted (Morhardt et al. 2002; Deegan and
Rankin 1996; Guenther et al. 2006; Deegan and Gordon 1996; Deegan et al. 2002). Few
detailed, in-depth, appraisals of environmental reporting were performed (Belai 2002;
Moerman and Van Der Laan 2005) and fewer studies compared corporate social and
environmental reporting to external sources of information (Adams 2004; Ruffing 2007).
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Most prior research that examines relations among stakeholders and corporations in the
context of environmental disclosure adopted a static perspective in which stakeholders
had a straightforward directional influence on environmental disclosure, with the focus
generally being on corporate outputs such as annual or sustainability reports (Roberts
1992; Cormier et al. 2004; Belai and Owen 2007; Islam and Deegan 2008). However, I
argue that a broader and more refined depiction of stakeholder-firm interactions related to
environmental disclosure is emerging in the literature under the concept of "informational
dynamics." In these dynamics, corporations report environmental information in
response to their interpretation of stakeholders' opinions. This in turn shapes subsequent
stakeholder disclosures (or decisions not to disclose) on the environmental issues at stake
(Buhr 2007). Thus these dynamics encompass many environmental accounts issued by
different reporters (the corporation and various stakeholder groups), and these reports are
shaped by the respective environmental "ideologies, rationalities and values" of the
reporters (Georgakopoulos and Thomson 2008: 1118). In these dynamics, the overall
environmental performance of a corporation is understood through a construction of the
performance's portrayal based on the multiple reports (Georgakopoulos and Thomson
2008).
Prior studies are helpful in acknowledging the existence of a gap between corporate
environmental reporting and external information about the firm's environmental
management and performance, but there is work to be done in order to identify the
nuances within the gap. Initial steps were taken by Adams (2004). Relying on emerging
trends in social and environmental reporting research, this study extends Adams (2004)
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by analysing the informational dynamics taking place between a firm and its stakeholders
with respect to its environmental management.
3.3. Conceptual framework: ethical relativism and environmental disclosure
Both natural and human arguments advocate for the ethics of corporate environmental
protection. One may argue that the natural environment deserves ethical consideration
from the corporation due to its intrinsic value, i.e. plants, animals and all other
components of the natural environment are as worthy to be treated by high moral
standards as human beings (Hoffman 1991). Others may claim that embedded in the
ethics of the collective good is business' responsibility towards future generations and
their environmental rights (Jeurissen and Keijzers 2004), which translate into moral
obligations towards the environment today. Environmental disclosure has the potential to
lead to the expression of ethical environmental concerns (Mathews 1995) and therefore is
worth analysing from an ethical perspective.
Another argument for studying environmental issues from an ethical standpoint lies in
moral philosophy. Moral philosophy is an important component of ethics. It shapes
people's system of values by disentangling 'right' from 'wrong' (Ferrei et al. 2000).
Values are significant drivers of corporate social performance. Indeed, some models of
corporate social performance (including environmental performance) are based on the
conviction that corporations "must behave in a manner that is consistent with society's
values" (Wartick and Cochran 1985: 759). Values can be considered to be embedded in
corporate social performance in a way that shapes corporate response to social issues
(Swanson 1995). In the case of environmental performance, this response can take the
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form of corporate environmental communication (Cormier et al. 2004). Within the
corporation, external affairs management is often responsible for the external
communications of the corporation (e.g. public relations department). According to
Swanson (1999) this corporate function is also responsible for detecting the social values
the firm has to respond to. The values identified by external affairs are likely to shape the
content and format of corporate communications. In fact, the double responsibility of
external affairs (corporate communications and value detection) eliminates intermediaries
between value detection and corporate communication and as such reinforces the
influence of values on communication. In short, the role played by values in
environmental disclosure provides another argument for studying the informational
dynamics of environmental reporting from an ethical perspective.
Accordingly, in studying the case firm's environmental disclosure strategy in light of the
release of environmental information by its stakeholders, the moral philosophy of ethical
relativism is retained. This moral philosophy was selected following work on corporate
social performance and values emphasizing the need to account for value relativism (réf.:
Swanson 1999). This work also underlines the need to consider interactions between
corporations and social groups as a means to exchange ideas on the values at stake. On
some level, these interactions relate to the informational dynamics that are the focus of
the study.
Ethical relativism implies that individuals have different conceptions of moral values and
of what is right and wrong (Wong 1993). What is considered to be ethical or unethical is
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therefore subjective and changes from one individual to another (Wong 1993; Mackie
1987). In other words, "what is considered good at a particular point in time by one
society, individual or stakeholder group might not be regarded as good at other times or
by other societies, individuals or stakeholder groups" (Lewis and Unerman 1999: 521).
Extreme relativism implies that all moral standards can be thought to be right or wrong
depending on the context (Taylor 1987). Proponents of ethical relativism advocate for a
less radical version of relativism, recognizing that although there is no single morality,
some values or moral codes might be wrong given the situation (Wong 1993). Along this
line of thought, Lewis and Unerman (1999) developed a form of reasoned ethical
relativism in which most behaviors are subject to be deemed 'good' by some and 'bad'
by others, with certain behaviors being considered unacceptable at all times (such as
torture).19
This moderate form of relativism is adopted for the purpose of the paper. It stipulates
that ethical values are not objective, but instead are subjective and relative. It also
recognizes that although some broad-based values may be shared by different members
of the same society at the same point in time, the fulfillment of these values in everyday
life is likely to be relative, due to divergence on the specific moral standards used to
establish the morality of a behavior (Stace 1983; Lewis and Unerman 1999). Different
members of the same society are likely to have different takes on how to respect the
general moral values. Thus, the way to follow the somehow shared broad moral values is
also relative. In brief, this moral philosophy stipulates that different moral grounds are to
be expected from different members of the society (Stevenson and Godden 1992; Ferrei
19 Lewis and Unerman' s (1999) example.
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et al. 2000). Ethical relativism echoes the political arena approach, in which
representatives of different ideologies, rationalities and values interact around a common
issue (Georgakopoulos and Thomson 2008).
The above description of ethical relativism remains at the societal level. Ethical
relativism has also been conceptualized and empirically investigated at the corporate and
managerial levels (e.g. Chan and Armstrong 1999). For the purpose of this study, ethical
relativism has significant implications for social and environmental reporting (Lewis and
Unerman 1999). Voluntary social and environmental disclosure have long been
recognized as a legitimation device (Gray et al. 1995; Deegan 2002; Cho and Patten
2007) aiming to illustrate the firm's respect for its stakeholders' values (Richardson
1987). Therefore, "because of ethical relativism, such values vary both between different
stakeholder groups or societies, and over time, then the focus of legitimation, and the
form and content of corporate reporting used to support such legitimation, can also be
expected to vary in this manner" (Lewis and Unerman 1999: 526). This entails that social
and environmental reporting will be affected by the values managers have identified as
those that the corporation needs to demonstrate that it respects (Swanson 1 999). More
precisely, social and environmental reporting will be grounded in the values of the
stakeholders/society targeted by the disclosure. Because those values are ethically
relative, it is complex for corporate social and environmental disclosure to meet the needs
of multiple different stakeholders (Solomon and Solomon 2006). Difference in values
will lead to differences in the presentation and interpretation of information (Stevenson
and Godden 1992). Accordingly, social and environmental disclosure "that is appropriate
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for one society or stakeholder group at one point in time might not be appropriate for
other societies/stakeholder groups or other times" (Lewis and Unerman 1999: 523). Prior
work identifies cross-company and cross-country differences in social and environmental
disclosure (Lewis and Unerman 1999) and uncertainty concerning the nature of the
information to disclose (Solomon and Solomon 2006) as consequences of ethical
relativism for social and environmental reporting.
In the present study, the case firm and its stakeholders provide separate accounts of the
firm's environmental performance within the informational dynamics of environmental
management. These accounts can be compared to different metaphors depicting the case
firm's environmental situation. For each reporter, some elements are considered and
others are left out, leading to different conceptions of the firm's environmental
performance (Morgan 1988, 1997). The inclusion and exclusion of certain elements
suggest that different values or ways to respect those values underlie each of these
metaphors or reporting perspectives. In other words, according to ethical relativism, as
different members of society, the firm and its various stakeholders are likely to abide by
different environmental values or follow different detailed codes to evaluate the moral
value of certain environmental behaviors. This would in turn, be reflected in their
respective environmental disclosures.20 Therefore, applied to the present case study,
reasoned ethical relativism suggests that the case firm's disclosure might differ from its
stakeholders' disclosure on the same environmental matters due to disagreement over
what is considered environmentally right and wrong from each perspective. It can be
20The impact of ethical relativism on disclosure is likely to affect both the content and the objectives
underlying disclosure. The study focuses on the content to avoid speculation concerning the objectives.
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argued that the reporting of the same message by both the case firm and its stakeholders
would imply that they share similar environmental values on this issue, whereas different




I use a longitudinal case study to investigate the dynamics of environmental reporting.
Multiple stakeholders potentially play a role in the voluntary reporting dynamics (Buhr
2007). Each stakeholder group may play its role differently and thereby each offers a
different perspective on the reporting firm. As such, understanding the multiple
perspectives associated with the dynamics of environmental reporting requires an in-
depth analysis, which is the focus of the case study (Creswell 1998; Eisenhardt 1989).
Moreover, it is necessary to gather a deep contextual knowledge of accounting practices
aimed at demonstrating conformity with moral values, such as environmental reporting
(Richardson 1987).The case study also offers the opportunity to take the values of the
parties involved into account (Cooper and Morgan 2008), in line with the conceptual
framework. The scant evidence currently available on the dynamics of reporting also
justifies the case study approach (Leonard-Barton 1990). Finally, focusing on a single
case is appropriate for longitudinal analysis (Yin 2003).
The study is therefore conducted through a case study in which corporate environmental
disclosure is compared with environmental disclosure related to the case firm reported by
stakeholders. For each selected stakeholder group, corporate environmental disclosure is
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contrasted with that particular group's disclosure. This approach allows the comparison
of corporate disclosure with stakeholders' needs as expressed in their own release of
information. The relevance of the stakeholder perspective for this study is supported by
the stakeholders' influence on corporate environmental disclosure (Cormier et al. 2004;
Deegan and Blomquist 2006) and by the stakeholders' role in the voluntary disclosure
dynamics (Buhr 2007). Four stakeholder groups are analyzed: investors, governments,
community and ENGOs. These stakeholders were chosen because of their recognition in
prior stakeholder literature (e.g. see Donaldson and Preston 1995), their interest and
influence over environmental reporting (Tilt 2007) and the importance of considering
these groups when evaluating corporate environmental performance (Ilinitch et al. 1998;
ISO 1999).21 The disclosure is analysed over a period of three years (2005 to 2007) in
order to fully capture the dynamics of environmental reporting.
3.4.2 The case firm
Intensity sampling, which focuses on "cases that manifest the phenomenon of interest
intensely" (Patton 2002: 234), was used to identify the firm to study. Applying this
sampling strategy led to the selection of a firm that discloses a significant volume of
voluntary environmental information owing to the important environmental impact of its
activities, and that attracts a high level of environmental disclosure from external sources.
In other words, such a sampling strategy led to the selection of a case where the quantity
of environmental information disclosed, by the organization as well as by external
2lEmployees, clients and suppliers were considered as relevant perspectives for the study but were excluded
due to data unavailability.
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sources, is significant, and thereby ensures the investigation of an information-rich case
(Patton 2002).
The case firm selected for the analysis is Abitibi-Consolidated (hereafter AC). Operating
in the forest and paper products industry, the case firm produces newsprint, commercial
printing papers and wood products, and is headquartered in Montreal, Canada. In
addition to Canada, the company operates in the United States and the United Kingdom;
and had more than 12,500 employees at the end of 2006 (Hoover 2008). Its sales totalled
$4.1 billion in 2006, and it was listed on both the Toronto Stock Exchange and the New
York Stock Exchange for the period under study.
The major environmental areas of concern in the forest and paper products industry are
forest management, recycling, climate change, air, water and energy (FPAC 2008). ACs
performance with regard to these issues is addressed to different degrees in its annual
report, its sustainability report (entitled 'Complete Global Review') and its website. ACs
environmental performance is also of interest to a broad range of stakeholders. As a
major employer in Canada and the United States, ACs economic and environmental
activities are monitored by governments (e.g. Government of Ontario 2005; NRC 2005).
ACs size ensures that its environmental actions are highly visible within communities
through media coverage (Cormier and Gordon 2001). The environmentally sensitive
nature of its activities also attracts the attention of ENGOs. Investors are interested in the
environmental performance of this publicly traded firm, as evidenced by the firm's
22Abitibi-Consolidated merged with Bowater on October 29, 2007. The resulting company,
AbitibiBowater, is not included in this study.
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inclusion in rankings of social and environmental investments (Brearton et al. 2005;
Brearton et al. 2007). The wide attention given to ACs environmental performance
makes the firm a worthwhile case for the investigation of the dynamics of environmental
reporting.
3.4.3. Data collection
The first step in data collection was to identify, based on prior literature, the different
documents that would represent each of the five perspectives (AC, governments, ENGOs,
community and investors).23 Table 9 below presents an overview of the types of
documents that were collected for each perspective, with an explanation of the relevance
of each document in the representation of the perspective.
Guidance from Adams and Laing (2000) was especially useful in the process. These authors provide
information on where and how to search for information on companies. They cover sources of
information on the general industry background, the general company background and social
performance. They also highlight how to approach the practitioner and the academic literatures.
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Table 9 : Documents collected for each reporting perspective













As in Gray (1997) and Van Staden and
Hooks (2007), all examples of organized
corporate environmental disclosure were
collected in order to capture the most






Official publications, press releases and
websites are considered to be the main
disclosure outlets of ENGOs (Dey 2007;




Media attention is used as a proxy for
community concern as in Brown and
Deegan (1998) and Deegan et al. (2002).




The CSID provides to interested
investors detailed reports and related
industry rankings on the social,
environmental and governance
performance of hundreds of publicly
traded firms (Jantzi Research 2008).
Jantzi Research is the Canadian
counterpart of the U.S.-based KLD (réf.:
KLD 2009a). Because KLD data have
been widely used in management
research (e.g. Graves and Waddock
1994; Johnson and Greening 1999) and
are now employed in environmental
accounting research (Cho and Patten
2007; Cho et al. 2006), it is considered
relevant to employ the Canadian
equivalent of KLD data, Jantzi
Research's CSED, as a proxy for





Official publications, press releases and
websites are considered to be the main
disclosure outlets of governments
(Adams and Laing 2000).
In order to be collected, all non-corporate documents had to communicate information on the case firm's
environmental issues.
The second step in data collection was the delimitation of the boundaries of each
perspective, i.e. where does data collection end for each group? For some perspectives,
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the delimitation was straightforward. Corporate communication outlets were designated
as the boundaries for AC whereas Jantzi Historical Profiles were selected as the limits of
the investors' perspectives. Delimitation of the remaining perspectives required a more
elaborate approach. Given the large number of existing ENGOs and the numerous levels
of governments from which information could potentially be gathered, the following
criteria were adopted to delineate data collection in these two perspectives. ENGOs were
selected based on their national or international scope or impact. This method ensures
that data collection is centered on the key messages in the ENGOs disclosure. In total,
nine ENGOs were found to have disclosed environmental information related to the case
firm for the period under study. As for governments, because the case firm is
headquartered in Canada, levels of government were selected based on their involvement
in Canadian broad-scope environmental regulation. Consistent with this criterion, data
were collected for the Canadian federal government and the four provincial governments
in which the case firm operates (British Columbia, Newfoundland, Ontario and Quebec).
Finally, the community perspective was confined to newspaper articles covering the case
firm's environmental issues in the ABi Inform, Eureka and Factiva databases.
The third step of data collection was the selection of relevant documents from all those
available from each perspective. Documents were retained if they 1) cover an
environmental issue and 2) relate to AC. For databases and website searches, a search
engine query using keywords24 was employed to identify the relevant information on AC
and the environment. In total, 225 documents were gathered for analysis for the years
2005, 2006 and 2007.
24The keywords employed are "environment", "pollution", "emission" and "sustainability'. Keywords were
truncated to broaden the scope of research.
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The last step of data collection was the classification of the documents into the
appropriate year for the period under study. The documents collected were categorized
for either 2005, 2006 or 2007 based on their date ofpublication. For instance, ACs 2005
annual report was categorized for the year 2006 because it was released in early 2006.
Applying this rule was necessary to follow the sequence of firm-stakeholder disclosures
essential to the analysis of the dynamics of reporting.
3.4.4. Data analysis
Once qualitative data collection is completed, the raw information collected needs to be
transformed into meaningful data (Patton 2002). To reduce the raw information, I
classified the information collected into categories using an adapted version of the coding
scheme of Cormier and Magnan (2003) and Aerts, Cormier and Magnan (2008). This
coding scheme organizes environmental disclosure into 39 categories grouped into six
themes. The scheme is designed for information classification across industries, and as
such is not industry-specific. Given the in-depth analysis of a single firm performed here,
it was necessary to adjust the coding scheme to the forest and paper industry in which the
selected firm operates. To do so, I followed the steps suggested by Guthrie et al. (2008).
These authors recommend developing an industry-specific coding scheme based on
information disclosed by 1) industry associations, councils and governmental bodies; 2)
sustainability ranking organizations and 3) best practices in sustainability reporting in the
industry. Only step 2) was not accomplished, because a sustainability ranking
organization is included as a data source (CSID by Jantzi Research proxies for investors'
perspective) thus following this step would have led to the inappropriate development of
a coding scheme specifically tailored to one of the perspectives investigated in the study.
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The result of the adjustment process was the addition of forestry-related (compliance with
forest regulation, biodiversity, forest management, logging practices, forest certification,
forest renewal), production-related (water consumption, environmentally friendly
products), energy-related (efforts to reduce energy, energy sources) and performance-
related (rankings) categories to the original coding scheme. The extended coding
scheme, containing 52 categories divided into seven themes, is presented in Appendix 4.
Once each corporate or non-corporate document was collected, it was imported into
Atlas.ti software (Atlas.ti 2004). The software was employed to organize the data and to
provide a structure to data analysis. Coding and further analyses were performed by the
researcher. Coding was accomplished by classifying each individual unit of
environmental information in corporate and non-corporate documents as a quotation
within a disclosure category and an information source category (AC, Investors, ENGOs,
Governments or Community). After the initial coding, all codes were reviewed to verify
the reliability of the coding. Any inconsistency was investigated and adjusted if
necessary. A final review of all codes then followed to further ensure coding reliability.
The approach used for data analysis is based on Kisfalvi (2000) and Langley (1999). On a
yearly basis, the content of each environmental disclosure category was analyzed for each
information source (within-perspective analysis) in order to understand and summarize
the information collected regarding each topic. Next, each category of environmental
disclosure is compared across information sources (cross-perspective analysis) in order to
identify differences and similarities in the environmental information reported by the
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various disclosers. To perform this cross-perspective analysis, seven matrices were
produced. Each matrix places the information reported by the firm and its stakeholders in
relation regarding one of the disclosure themes (An example of a matrix is presented in
Appendix 5). In total, 21 matrices were elaborated, seven for each of the three years of
the study. While it provides insight on the outcomes of the informational dynamics taking
place between AC and its stakeholders, this approach does not account for the intentions
underlying the disclosure strategy of each perspective. Similarly, it does not expose the
rationale behind the absence of disclosure. These elements are left to future research.
To summarize, using Langley's (1999) terminology, a grounded theory strategy is
adapted to form the basis of data analysis.- The visual mapping strategy is used to
complement and refine analysis and interpretation. Both strategies aim at creating
sensemaking through the development of patterns (Langley 1999), in this case within the
firm's environmental reporting dynamics. Disclosure was uneven across the categories,
with some categories receiving more attention (e.g. logging practices) than others (e.g.
financing for investments). Below, the results are discussed for the categories for which
disclosure was sufficient to allow and support the identification of patterns.
3.5. Comparing ACs and its stakeholders' environmental disclosures
This section introduces different patterns of disclosure observed through the analysis of
the nature of the information disclosed by the case firm and its stakeholders. All patterns
emerged from data analysis. Each pattern is described with supporting evidence, linked to
prior literature and interpreted in light of the conceptual framework. All the corporate
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and stakeholder documents (i.e. data sources) cited or quoted in this section are listed in
Appendix 6.
3.5.1. Uniformity
The first disclosure pattern observed is labelled uniformity. In this pattern, the same
message is disclosed by all reporting perspectives. All stakeholders have the same
opinion of a specific aspect of the case firm's environmental approach (i.e. a disclosure
category) and accordingly report a message that corresponds with the case firm's
message. Adams (2004) does not mention having encountered such a disclosure pattern
in her comparison of corporate and non-corporate social disclosure. Accordingly, the
uniformity or performance agreement pattern presented here may extend the stream of
literature on the social reporting performance gap. The quotations listed in Table 10
provide evidence of disclosure uniformity regarding ISO 14001 certification, the
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ISO 14001 "All the Company 's operations are
certified ISO 14001. " (AR 2006: 36)
"The company 's objective was to have all its
(...) facilities and sawmills certified to the ISO
14001 environmental management system
standard by the end of2004. It essentially





- Refers to the environmental, health
and safety committee of the board
(AR 2006: 110)
- Mentions the board environmental, health
and safety committee






million hectares ofwoodlands in
Canada, the Company is committed
to the sustainability ofthe natural
resources in its care." (AR2006: 13)
"The company 's stated values include a
commitment to the protection and
enhancement ofthe natural resources in its
care."
Recycling "Abitibi-Consolidated is also one of
the largest recyclers ofnewspapers
and magazines in North America. "
(CGR 2006: 3)
Governments, community and ENGOs are absent from the
listed environmental categories.
b All quotes and citations are from Jantzi Research (2007).
"Abitibi-Consolidated is the largest collector
and recycler ofold newspapers and
magazines in North America and the largest
newspaper recycler in the world. "
table because they did not provide information on the
For 2005, 2006 and 2007, in all four disclosure categories, the message conveyed by each
of the stakeholder perspectives is coherent with the message of the case firm.
Governments and investors confirm the certification of the AC environmental
management system by ISO 14001 standards. Similarly, the existence of individuals
responsible for environmental management at the board or executive levels is recognized
by governments, community and investors. Further, ACs commitment to the
"sustainability of natural resources" is echoed by community through "sustainable
forestry," by governments and investors through the "protection and enhancement of
natural resources in its care" and by the "environmental commitment" underlined by
ENGOs. AC's leadership in paper recycling is acknowledged by the community and
investors through their statements on the large scale of the firm's recycling activities and
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with the acknowledgement that ACs recycling program increases environmental
awareness within the communities in which it operates.
Uniformity is found between the case firm and its stakeholders from 2005 to 2007 for all
disclosure categories, although fewer stakeholder groups report on those issues in 2006
and 2007. Governments, community and ENGOs disclose mainly in 2005 or 2006,
whereas investors report information on the four disclosure categories consistently over
the three years. The message reported by the case firm and its stakeholders is uniform
within and across all three years. Uniformity in the message disclosed in a given year
does not in itself demonstrate ethical relativism, because stakeholders and the firm agree
on the current state of the environmental issues at stake and they appear to share similar
values concerning these issues. However, ethical relativism is also a matter of values
changing over time (Lewis and Unerman 1999; Wong 1993). A weak form of relativism
is found in the decreasing number of stakeholders reporting on the issues over the years.
While investors keep reporting on ISO 14001 certification, environmental manager/
governance, environmental policy and recycling, governments, community and ENGOs
all decrease their disclosure or turn to other environmental issues over the years. This
change in stakeholder disclosure away from ACs disclosure is likely to be a change in
stakeholders' values over time towards concerns other than the categories listed in
Table 10.
3.5.2. Silos
Silos refer to the pattern of disclosure in which some stakeholders and the case firm
report different pieces of environmental information regarding the same disclosure
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category. The message reported by stakeholders does not confirm or contradict the
message reported by AC, but instead complements it. The case firm and its stakeholders
report on their respective interests in the disclosure category without relating to one
another, i.e. they report in silos. Table 1 1 gathers the different elements reported by each
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The following observations are derived from the analysis of Table 11. While
environmental operating costs are covered by AC, governments, community and
investors, the type of costs and the way costs are discussed vary from one perspective to
the other. For instance, in 2005, AC discloses its total costs, its concern about future
costs and some environmental initiatives that reduce costs. Governments mention the
costs paid by AC for conservation and remediation projects and other environmental
initiatives that reduce costs. Finally, the community supplies information on compliance
costs and the costs incurred for another conservation project. In 2006, AC again provides
information on its total costs, its concern about future costs and some environmental
initiatives that reduce costs. Governments cover the costs paid by AC for remediation
projects and the savings obtained through environmental initiatives. As for the
community, it releases cost information on other remediation projects. Finally, investors
concentrate on purchasing strategies and the cost of carbon offsetting. In 2007, AC
discusses the different aspects of environmental costs, savings generated by greenhouse
gases, energy strategies and the related competitive advantage, while governments, the
community and investors report information on other energy initiatives that generated
savings. The community also mentions carbon-related savings. In each of the three years,
it seems that each disclosing stakeholder seeks to complete ACs disclosure by adding
particular performance elements that matter in their perspective.
Within the 3-year time span covered by the study, silos appear to be stronger in the first
two years than in the last one. The different categories of costs covered by AC and its
stakeholders are more distinct in 2005 and 2006 than in 2007. Silos appear to fade in
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2007, because although AC is the sole reporter to mention total environmental costs,
concerns about energy prices and savings (competitive advantage) derived from GHG
strategy (energy assets) and only the community refers to carbon trading, all reporters
discussed alternatives employed by AC to generate savings through energy efficiency
programs, and both investors and AC cover the issue of energy purchasing strategy. The
similar message provided by all perspectives on some cost issues suggests that all
reporting perspectives are moving towards the uniformity pattern (Section 3.5. 1 .) in 2007.
In the silo pattern, ethical relativism is found in the content of the operating cost
disclosures. The ethics of this subject is relative in that different disclosures are deemed
appropriate by each reporter for the purpose to cover the same operating costs issue. The
detailed moral code regarding the ethical management of operating costs varies from one
reporting perspective to the next. However, the level of relativism in the present situation
appears to be low because stakeholders do not criticize or contradict the case firm, as a
bigger clash between corporate and stakeholder values would have demanded (see the
opposition pattern (Section 3.5.4.) for instance). Instead, the stakeholders opt to simply
complement the information provided by AC, evidenced by the fact that most stakeholder
disclosure occurred after corporate disclosure.
This pattern differs from the opposition pattern (Section 5.1.4) in the sense that the information provided
by stakeholders does not contradict ACs disclosure, but instead complements it. From a broader
legitimacy perspective, the arguments of biased corporate environmental disclosure (see Berthelot et al.
2003 for a review) are not validated in this situation, because the information disclosed by stakeholders is
not negative, hence it cannot be claimed that the firm voluntarily omitted harmful environmental
information. Yet, in line with prior literature, the information provided by AC on operating costs can be
qualified as incomplete because it does not satisfy stakeholders' interests (Adams 2004; Belai 2002;
Moerman and Van Der Laan 2005; GRI 2006; ISEA 1999). Nonetheless, the silo pattern adds nuances to
this stream of literature by demonstrating that not all omissions are negatively biased and aim to withhold
detrimental information from stakeholders. Omissions could result from an inadequate assessment of
stakeholders' values and interests.
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3.5.3. (Ir)responsibility
In this third disclosure pattern, stakeholders report the case firm's appropriate and
inappropriate behaviors regarding the same environmental issue. Stakeholders not only
recognize the environmental responsibility demonstrated by the case firm, but also
denounce its environmental irresponsibility. The environmental performance underlined
by this pattern of disclosure is coherent with an emerging stream of management
literature arguing that firms can simultaneously be socially responsible and irresponsible.
Strike et al. (2006:850) contend that "firms can be socially responsible in some activities
and irresponsible in others" and they provide evidence that the more internationally
diversified a multinational corporation is, the more it acts in a socially responsible
manner in some countries and in an irresponsible manner in others. Assuming that
stakeholder disclosures reflect the environmental performance of the case firm, the
findings below extend this stream of literature in two ways. First, it shows that a firm can
be environmentally responsible and irresponsible regarding the same activity, here
logging practices. Second, it demonstrates that a firm can be environmentally responsible
and irresponsible within the same country, because all practices described in Table 12
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In 2005 (see Table 12a), all stakeholders describe some logging practices performed by
the case firm as adequate. Governments talk of "careful logging methods" stimulating
forest renewal; the community refers to areas where AC employs alternatives to clear-
cutting; ENGOs reveal that AC "postponed most logging operations" in designated intact
areas; and investors draw attention to harvesting agreements reached with Aboriginals.
At the same time, all stakeholder groups point out inadequate logging practices carried
out by AC. Governments report that the case firm harvested more timber than allowed by
regulation; the community highlights how AC and others would like to harvest one of the
few remaining intact forests in the province of Quebec; ENGOs and investors identify
"environmentally [unsustainable" logging operations, "clear-cut areas" and wildlife
habitat destruction.
A similar acknowledgement of responsible and irresponsible logging practices is found
among disclosing stakeholders in 2006 (see Table 12b), albeit with some nuances. The
community and investors mention responsible logging practices such as postponing or
stopping harvesting in areas marked for protection. However, these stakeholders again
identify irresponsible logging practices. The community reports that harvests have
resumed in a controversial area while investors reveal how AC is accused of overcutting
and clearcutting. In the community disclosure, the environmentally appropriate and
inappropriate practices are intertwined in the same quotation, as if the stakeholder
intended to underline the relative logging performance of the case firm. As for ENGOs,
they appear to have given up the recognition of environmentally appropriate logging
practices performed by AC to concentrate their disclosure strategy on inappropriate
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logging practices, exemplified by the "ecologically devastating logging practices" they
denounce in Table 12b.
In 2007, a similar (irresponsibility pattern is found, again with some nuances. In that
year, Greenpeace launched a vast campaign aiming at denouncing ACs unsustainable
logging practices. Most ENGOs disclosures that year are related to that campaign, and
all refer to unsustainable logging practices. Like in 2006, the ENGOs do not identify any
responsible logging efforts. As for the community, it gives credit to AC for some
responsible practices in the general efforts forestry companies made to improve their
practices, and in acknowledging ACs communication with an ENGO. Those two
elements are the sole responsible practices the community attributes to AC for that year.
Investors do not identify any new responsible logging practices in ACs actions, so they
mention responsible practices they had identified in previous years. At the same time, the
community and investors underline irresponsible logging practices performed by AC in
2007 by reproducing the message Greenpeace released on ACs unsustainable logging
practices ("looters of our forests"). Although they report both responsible and
irresponsible logging practices in 2007, the community and investors appear to lean
towards the irresponsible perspective, because their disclosure of responsible practices is
weaker: the community only has two responsible elements in all its disclosure and
investors do not provide any new information on ACs responsible practices. Moreover,
both groups used the message of irresponsibility reported by ENGOs to emphasize the
irresponsibility they noticed.
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This pattern of informational dynamics generally holds over the three years under study
for most stakeholder groups. Community and investors disclose both responsible and
irresponsible logging practices every year, even though they tend to reduce their release
of responsible practices in the last year. As for ENGOs, they stop disclosing positive
information on ACs wood harvesting practices in 2006 and continue to disclose only
negative information in 2007. Although the pattern is maintained in 2007 for two of the
three reporting stakeholders, altogether, the stakeholders appear to be moving towards the
opposition pattern (Section 3.5.4.) of disclosure for logging practices - if they have not
already done so.
This pattern of firm-stakeholder disclosure demonstrates etbjcakrelativism in the form of
an agreement on a general environmental principle (sustainable logging) for which the
detailed rules one must follow in order to fulfill this principle are relative (Lewis and
Unerman 1999). The coverage of logging practices from all reporting perspectives
stresses the importance of this environmental principle for all. However, the ground rules
to follow in order to achieve sustainable logging practices appear to differ between the
firm and its stakeholders. AC only reports good practices (i.e. detailed moral rules) it has
implemented in order to log in a sustainable manner. However, while the stakeholders
concede that the firm follows some good logging practices, they also denounce its
violation of other detailed moral rules related to sustainable logging in the form of
reporting irresponsible logging practices. Accordingly, what is considered ethically
adequate by AC in order to log sustainably is not considered totally ethically adequate by
all of its stakeholders, and this relativism concerning logging practices increases over the
125
years. The community, ENGOs and investors decrease the quantity of their responsible
comments over time, and ENGOs even halt their disclosure of acceptable behaviors on
ACs logging practices. This suggests a move towards more demanding sustainable
logging practices in stakeholders' environmental values over time that has not been
identified or acknowledged by AC (Lewis and Unerman 1999; Wong 1993).
The case firm's disclosure strategy in this pattern is also interesting. The quotations
presented in Table 12 are the sole quotations collected that specifically discuss ACs
logging practices, and they mention responsible practices, namely 1) careful harvesting
for regeneration, 2) development of a logging pattern dedicated to the protection of the
caribou habitat and 3) harvesting burnt wood instead of growing trees, with some -
practices being repeated over the years. For instance, regeneration of the forest after
harvesting is mentioned in 2005 and again in 2007. The use of burnt wood as a raw
material was also reported for two years in a row, 2006 and 2007. It seems like AC
presents an indirect reply to stakeholder statements on poor logging practices through
numerous statements concerning forest management certification. Three of these
statements are presented below.
"By the end of2004, some 13.6 million hectares were certified under SFM
[Sustainable Forest Management] stands, representing 78% of all public
andprivateforestland we manage. We were the first producer in Ontario,
Québec and Newfoundland to get tenures certified under the CSA-SFM
standard. " (AR 2004: 7)
'"[Forest] certification is primarily about providing objective evidence of sustainable forest management
planning and practices. Its concept is similar to a financial audit inasmuch as third-party experts verify a
company's performance against a set of objective standards" (FPAC 2008). The internationally recognized
standards by the Canadian Standards Association (CSA), the Forest Sustainability Council (FSC) and the
Sustainable Forestry Initiative (SFI) are employed in Canada.
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"By having our forest practices independently evaluated and certified, we
are demonstrating our commitment to the sustainability of the forests
entrusted to us." (Report on forest certification 2005: 1)
"Our objective is to have all theforests entrusted to us certified to an SFM
[Sustainable Forest Management] standard by the end of 2005. This
aggressive timetable will help meet the needs and expectations of our
stakeholders and the general public" (Report on forest certification
2005: 1)
In these quotations, AC underlines its general commitment to the sustainability of the
forests, its leadership in forest management certification as well as its concern for
stakeholders' expectations in this matter. The other quotations (not cited) collected from
AC on forest management certification cover the available standards (what they are and
how they compare with each other) and ACs chain-of-custody certification project.
Overall, although AC states its concern for stakeholders' expectations regarding forest
management (forest management implicitly including logging practices) in the third
quote above, its disclosure does not address the stakeholder concerns listed in Table 12,
namely the quantity of wood harvested (governments), the forest to be harvested
(community) and the way the forest is harvested (ENGOs and investors) and instead
concentrates on forest certification. It appears that the detailed code of conduct the case
firm is following to achieve the value of sustainable logging attributes significant
importance to general forest management, whereas stakeholders' detailed moral code
emphasizes more specific logging practices. This results in different portrayals of ACs
forest-related environmental performance and reinforces the relative ethical standpoint
from which stakeholders and AC judge the firm's achievement of sustainable logging.
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3.5.4. Opposition
The last pattern of disclosure is the opposite of the first pattern (Section 3.5.1). In the
opposition pattern, stakeholder disclosures contradict corporate disclosures. In these
situations, stakeholders and the ease firm differ in their interpretation of a specific aspect
of the case firm's environmental performance (i.e. a disclosure category) and
stakeholders voice their opposition by reporting a message that conflicts with the case
firm's message. The quotations below support the pattern by demonstrating that
investors, ENGOs and the community disagree with the case firm's disclosure on some
aspects of its environmental performance.
Investors' and ACs assessment of the firm's compliance registry contrast significantly.
In its evaluation of AC for investors in 2005, Jantzi Research mentioned: "Despite the
company's efforts to reduce emissions, it has experienced ongoing environmental
compliance problems in a number of jurisdictions over the last five years'" (Jantzi
Research 2005). Again in 2007, reports from investors' representatives underline ACs
environmental compliance issues: "Producing paper and wood products still generates
significant air and water pollution, and companies such as Abitibi-Consolidated,
Norbord, Tembec and West Fraser Timber have all paid significant fines for violating
environmental regulations in recent years" (Brearton et al. 2007). Nevertheless, in early
2005, 2006 and 2007, AC simply stated that "The Company believes that it is in material
compliance with all laws and regulations governing its activities'" (AR 2004:61; AR
2005: 32; AR 2007: 35). The quotations are contradictory, since investors draw attention
to ACs problems of compliance whereas AC mentions that it does not have any
problems in this area.
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Similarly, biodiversity management is evaluated differently by AC and ENGOs. A report
on forest certification published by AC in October 2005 affirms that it "value[s]
biodiversity in the natural habitat" (Report on forest certification 2005: 2). However, a
report published a few weeks later by the Canadian Parks and Wilderness Society
contradicts this statement by listing "diminishing wildlife habitat" (CPAWS 2005: 6) and
"loss ofintact wilderness" (CPAWS 2005: 3) as consequences of AC harvesting levels in
the Whiskey Jack Forest of Northern Ontario. Similarly, in a brochure on responsible
wood and fibre supply published in 2007, AC presents "Biodiversity maintained"
(Brochure on supply 2007: 4) as one of the benefits of its adoption of sustainable forest
practices. In the same year, Greenpeace argued that 'Wo/ only are these companies
[Abitibi-Consolidated, Kruger and BowaterJ impacting biodiversity values such as
intactness and habitat for threatened wildlife, but there are serious climate change
implications to their logging practices as weir (Greenpeace report 2007: 5). Here again
AC and one of its stakeholder groups are in opposition. The firm states that it is
committed to biodiversity protection, yet ENGOs argue that AC caused damage to
biodiversity through its logging practices or, in other words, that the firm's biodiversity
commitment, if any, is not convincing.
AC and the community have divergent opinions on the firm's water discharges. In early
2006, AC underscores how it decreased its water pollution: "The drop in BOD
[Biological Oxygen Demand] (-93%) and in TSS [Total Suspended Solids] (-66%) is due
to the installation ofeffluent treatment systems at all mills, as well as fibre loss reduction
program within the mills" (CGR 2005: 19). In late 2006, a local newspaper challenged
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the AC statement on water pollution when it reported a ranking of the fifty biggest water
polluters in Canada: "The paper-maker Abitibi-Consolidated (...) ranks second fin terms
ofwater pollution], due in part to the sixfold increase in its phosphorus emissions at its
Alma plant" (Translation of Moreault 2006). Once again AC and one of its stakeholder
groups present contradictory discourses. While AC emphasizes the improvement of its
water-related environmental performance, a community representative highlights ACs
poor overall achievement in terms of water pollution.
From a longitudinal perspective, opposition is the only inconsistent pattern over the
years. It is ad hoc in that stakeholders disclose their discontent with the firm regarding the
- issue at stake only when they deem it necessary and do not repeat their disagreement
from year to year. Further, from the evidence provided above, it appears that the
opposition pattern occurs in a specific manner: the case firm discloses positive
environmental information that is contradicted by negative stakeholder information or,
otherwise stated, the firm presents good environmental performance arguments while
stakeholders report poor environmental performance arguments. The pattern is explained
to a great extent by ethical relativism, because it demonstrates how some behavior is
considered to be ethical by the corporation while it is considered unethical by the
stakeholders. Corporate environmental disclosure is intended to legitimize a corporation
by demonstrating how its actions have fulfilled environmental moral values (Lewis and
Unerman 1999; Richardson 1987). AC accomplishes this demonstration by highlighting
its good performance with respect to compliance, biodiversity and water discharges.
However, the responding stakeholders appear to have different values on these issues,
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values they voice by reporting ACs bad performance on the environmental matters of
interest. The relativism existing between ACs and its stakeholders' values regarding
biodiversity, water and compliance renders the corporation's disclosure inappropriate for
the selected stakeholders.
Placed within the broader legitimacy literature, the opposition pattern of disclosure
presented here is consistent with the stream of environmental reporting literature arguing
that environmental disclosure is biased towards positive information (e.g.: Deegan and
Gordon 1996; Deegan and Rankin 1996) and that it does not reflect the underlying
environmental performance of the firm (Patten 2002, 2005; Adams 2004; Hughes et al.
2001; Cho 2009). -
3.5.5. Interrelations among patterns
The four disclosure patterns appear to be more interrelated than independent. Indeed,
opposition is found in the (irresponsibility pattern, and the former pattern could almost
be thought of as a subset of the latter. Also, a change in stakeholder disclosure strategy
may lead to a shift from one pattern to another. All stakeholder groups weakened their
silo pattern and moved towards uniformity in disclosure in 2007. Similarly, ENGOs
moved from (irresponsibility to opposition in 2006. With these shifts, stakeholders'
stances become more approving or more critical of corporate environmental activities.
Both the diversity of possible shifts in patterns and the implicit changes in stakeholders'
assessments of the corporation's environmental performance associated with these shifts
"Because governments are the sole stakeholder group that do not formulate opposition vis-à-vis AC, it
could be speculated that ACs disclosure on compliance, biodiversity and water discharges are dedicated
to this stakeholder, with which the firm appears to share similar values (Lewis and Unerman 1999).
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underscore the complexity of the informational dynamics taking place between AC and
its stakeholders with respect to environmental issues.
3.6. Discussion
3.6.1. Intensity of ethical relativism
Ethical relativism stipulates that what is considered ethical or unethical is subjective and
thus varies from one individual, stakeholder and society, or point in time to another
(Wong 1993; Lewis and Unerman 1999; Mackie 1987). I argue that the intensity of
ethical relativism is bound to vary due to its subjective nature. I define weak ethical
relativism as characterized by minor differences (if not similarities) in values whereas
strong ethical relativism is distinguished by significant differences in values. Table 13
groups the four patterns of disclosure described above along with their environmental
issues and their intensity of ethical relativism.
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The summary in Table 1 3 indicates that ethical relativism varies in intensity depending
on the environmental issues at stake. The issues of ISO certification, environmental
governance mechanisms, volume of recycling activities, broadly defined environmental
policy and environmental costs are associated with weaker ethical relativism, depicted by
the uniformity and silo patterns. It may be the factual nature of these issues that makes
them less subject to interpretation, since factual reality leads to agreement among
communicators (Watzlawick 1976). Less ambiguity about the interpretation of an issue
diminishes the possibilities of evaluating it from a different moral standpoint. The
existence within the case firm of ISO certification, environmental governance
mechanisms and a broad environmental policy, along with the volume of the recycling
activities (in terms of weight of recycled paper) and the sum of the firm's environmental
costs are all verifiable environmental activities that call for less subjectivity when they
are presented to stakeholders in environmental reports.
However, issues like logging practices, compliance level, biodiversity conservation and
water pollution are associated with stronger ethical relativism, as seen in the
(irresponsibility and the opposition patterns. The fact that these issues are more prone to
appraisal and judgements may explain this greater degree of relativism. The extent to
which logging practices, environmental compliance levels, biodiversity conservation and
water pollution are considered environmentally satisfactory depends on the (moral)
criteria upon which those activities are assessed and hence constitutes a matter of
appraisal for each reporting perspective. A greater opportunity for appraisal augments
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the possibility of relativism in the values underlying these issues. The outcome is
necessarily a more subjective evaluation of the situation (Watzlawick 1976).
3.6.2. To what extent is AC accountable to its stakeholders in its environmental disclosure?
Contrasting corporate social disclosure with external sources of information on the
corporation "seek[s] to construct, in as complete and transparent a way as is possible, a
picture of organizational accountability" (Dey 2007: 322). Therefore, the next step in the
comparison of ACs and its stakeholders' environmental disclosures is to assess the
degrees of accountability expressed by the patterns of disclosure depicted above.
Accountability is defined as the duty of an organization to provide an account of the
actions for which it is held responsible in the eyes of its stakeholders (Gray et al. 1997).
Addressing stakeholder expectations is the focus of accountability (Unerman and Bennett
2004) and, as such, stakeholders may be said to define the terms of accountability based
on their respective interests (Gray et al. 1997). Therefore, correspondence between
stakeholders' interests (in this situation as depicted in their disclosure) and corporate
disclosure is an important aspect of accountability (Unerman 2007). In particular,
completeness and reliability of environmental disclosure are fundamental to stakeholder
accountability in environmental management and performance (Gray et al. 1996; Adams
2004).
The patterns of disclosure between AC and its stakeholders demonstrate different levels
of accountability for different aspects of the case firm's environmental performance. In
the uniformity pattern (Section 3.5.1.), the message reported by AC corresponds to that of
its stakeholders. ACs message appears to be complete and reliable because it is
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confirmed by its stakeholders. This coherence suggests a high level of accountability for
the environmental aspects (information categories) under this pattern, namely
environmental management and recycling. In the silo pattern (Section 3.5.2.),
stakeholders and the case firm report different pieces of environmental information
regarding the same disclosure category. The message reported by stakeholders does not
confirm or deny the message reported by AC, but instead complements it. ACs message
is not as complete and reliable as a fully accountable message would be, but based on the
additional information offered by the stakeholders, the information not provided by AC is
not intended to be harmful to the stakeholders. This conveys a moderate level of
accountability for environmental operational costs, the disclosure category in which the
pattern is observed. In the (irresponsibility pattern (Section 3.5.3.), stakeholders
disclose information on ACs responsible and irresponsible environmental (logging)
practices. AC acknowledges responsible practices in its disclosure but does not address
irresponsible practices. In addition, AC appears to be deflecting the issue of logging
practices towards the issue of sustainable forest certification. In light of stakeholders'
disclosure, ACs message is therefore incomplete and unreliable, as it gives a partial
portrayal of ACs environmental performance with respect to logging practices. This
implies that a low level of accountability is offered by AC concerning its logging
practices. In the opposition pattern (Section 3.5.4), the information reported by the
stakeholders contradicts that reported by AC. Again, completeness and reliability are an
issue for this disclosure pattern, and the information conveyed by AC about compliance,
biodiversity and water discharges cannot be perceived as the outcome of an
accountability process since it conflicts with stakeholder disclosures. The last two
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patterns appear to be dedicated to the strategic legitimation of the case firm, and are not
meant to generate accountability (Deegan 2007). Table 1 3 summarizes these results.
The varying levels of accountability found in different elements of environmental
disclosure suggest that while the case firm cannot be praised for its full accountability, it
cannot be accused of being totally unaccountable either. This implies that ACs
environmental reporting is not entirely based on the values of the stakeholders examined.
Nonetheless, within the legitimacy literature, environmental disclosure is intended to
demonstrate correspondence between the firm's actions and its stakeholders' values
(Lewis and Unerman 1999; Richardson 1987). Why is this not the case here? Three
potential explanations based on ethical relativism are proposed. First, relativism can be
observed at one point in time (i.e. the time of the disclosure) between the environmental
values of AC and that of its stakeholders (Wong 1993). Second, one can also infer that
this is a matter of relativism over time, wherein AC failed to adequately communicate the
fulfillment of its stakeholders' values in its environmental disclosure, because it has not
noticed the change in the values over time (Unerman 1996). Third, this absence of
demonstration of correspondence between corporation actions and stakeholder values can
arise from ethical relativism among the different stakeholder groups. Lewis and Unerman
(1999: 524) argued that in the event of disagreement among stakeholder groups regarding
specific moral codes, "the relative power of different stakeholder groups is likely to
determine which detailed moral codes are addressed by a particular corporation's
legitimation strategies." This suggests that ACs environmental disclosure was intended
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to demonstrate the fulfilment of the values of other more powerful stakeholders than
those examined. For instance, the community and ENGOs might have been discarded as
the target audience because they are deemed marginal publics by the corporation (Neu et
al. 1998). Likewise, private communication could occur between the case firm and the
governments and investors (Solomon and Solomon 2006), thereby reducing the need to
target them in their public disclosure. Because the four stakeholder groups selected for
the study are important to consider when evaluating environmental performance (Ilinitch
et al. 1998; ISO 1999) and they have an interest in and influence on environmental
reporting (Tilt 2007), it seems inadequate that the case firm's environmental reporting is
not more tailored to meet their values. This inadequacy was recently recognized by the
CEO of the company (AbitibiBowater in 2008):
"Over the years, we took positive actions for the
environment, but we never mastered how to communicate
them. And as soon as an organization or an individual
questioned our practices, we had the reflex to brace
ourselves. We communicated poorly. Today, we try to be
more open, to integrate our actions in our message and not
to be on the defensive. " (Translated from Munger 2008: 43)
This recent change in the firm's communication approach remains to be assessed.
3.6.3. The relationship between the nature of environmental disclosure, accountability and
ethical relativism
The varying levels of accountability found in different pieces of corporate environmental
information seems to be tied to the strength of ethical relativism. Each pattern of
disclosure shows some form of accountability, ranging from high (uniformity) to low
28Stakeholder power can be defined as the extent of their control over the resources required by the
corporation in its operations (Ullmann 1985).
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{opposition). Each pattern of disclosure also demonstrates some form of ethical
relativism, ranging from weak relativism {uniformity) to strong relativism {opposition).
Accountability and ethical relativism appear to be opposing forces, with the more
relativism there is surrounding an issue, the less accountable the corporation is to the
stakeholders concerned with the issue. Interestingly, relativism is weaker for factual
environmental issues (e.g. ISO certification, governance mechanisms) and stronger for
environmental issues that are more prone to interpretation (e.g. logging practices,
biodiversity conservation - see Section 3.6.1). It is argued that accountability is improved
and relativism is lessened with the disclosures of factual information, as illustrated in
Figure 6. Although this is an insightful first step, the investigation of a single case study
limits the generalizability of this conclusion. Further research is warranted to support this
argument and contribute to the improvement of corporate environmental reporting.










This paper examined the interactions between corporate and non-corporate environmental
disclosure through the analysis of the informational dynamics of environmental
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management. This analysis was accomplished through a longitudinal case study
contrasting environmental information reported by the case firm with environmental
information about the firm disclosed by four stakeholder groups or their representatives,
namely governments, community, environmental non-governmental organizations and
investors. Results suggest the existence of a gap between corporate and stakeholder
environmental disclosures. This gap appears to be composed of different patterns
associated with different levels of accountability. The uniformity pattern suggests high
accountability with the absence of a gap on certain pieces of information. The silo
pattern underlines how the case firm does not adequately assess and respond to some of
its stakeholders' information needs, thereby creating a gap. This gap can be
performance-neutral, as in the silo pattern, but can also be performance-biased, as in the
(irresponsibility and the opposition patterns. Greater accountability is shown in the
performance-neutral gap than in the performance-bias gaps. Ethical relativism,
advocating for the non-objective, non-absolute status of moral principles among
individuals, stakeholders or societies, provides insights into the nuances in this gap by
explaining that the differences between the environmental values of the case firm and
those of its stakeholders create a gap in the information reported because different
environmental values call for different environmental disclosures.
As mentioned at the beginning of the paper, developing an understanding of corporate
environmental management and performance can be compared to looking through the
different facets of a prism, through which it is difficult to get a sense of the overall
environmental management and performance of a corporation. The present study may be
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conceived as an attempt to link the facets of the prism into a more understandable whole.
One facet argues that corporate environmental disclosure is used to cover poor
environmental performance (Patten 2002) whereas another facet suggests the opposite
(Al-Tuwaijri et al. 2004). The patterns found in the present study represent a first step in
reconciling these two facets. With their different levels of correspondence between
corporate and stakeholder disclosures, the patterns highlight nuances in the relationship
between environmental disclosure and environmental performance. Some corporate
pieces of information reflect environmental performance (as perceived by stakeholders)
more closely than others. In addition, studying the concept of environmental information
dynamics is relevant to the facets of the prism suggesting that stakeholders influence
environmental disclosure (Roberts 1992) or the reverse relationship (Milne and Patten
2002). The concept of informational dynamics adopted here does not portray the
relations between corporate disclosures and stakeholders as straightforward or
unidirectional, but instead suggests that both firms and stakeholders release
environmental information as part of a continuous process of bidirectional influence,
whose success varies. This study provides a fuller portrayal of corporate environmental
performance and management by tracing the relations between four facets of this prism.
Different limitations of the study need to be acknowledged. While focusing on a single
firm creates an in-depth understanding of the dynamics surrounding the case firm's
environmental reporting, it confines the generalizability of the results and precludes any
attempt to position ACs information dynamics vis-à-vis the dynamics of its peers. Also,
even though significant care has been taken during data collection, it is impossible to
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ensure the exhaustiveness of the data, especially for the stakeholder perspectives.
Finally, some stakeholder perspectives (for example, clients or employees) were excluded
from the study due to lack of available data. Including these perspectives would have
enriched the examination of the dynamics of environmental reporting. These limitations
do not prevent the study from contributing to the environmental accounting literature by
offering insights into the accountability of corporate environmental disclosure using a
stakeholder perspective. This perspective, coupled with ethical relativism, extends the
literature by breaking down the nature of the gap between corporate and non-corporate
environmental disclosure into diverse patterns and by adding nuances to the extent to
which an organization is accountable to its stakeholders.
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Chapter 4: Discussion and Integration
The scope of environmental accounting is broader than that of conventional (financial
and managerial) accounting (Gray 2002). It follows that the range of conventional
accounting information users is narrower than the range of environmental accounting
information users (Dillard 2007). Although investors and creditors are the main users of
financial accounting information (CICA 2009) and directors and managers are the main
users of managerial accounting information, they represent only a subset of stakeholders
concerned with environmental accounting information; customers, suppliers, employees,
unions, NGOs and the community are also interested in this information (Tilt 2007).
Taking environmental stakeholders into account in the development of environmental
accounting (Gray et al. 1997; Unerman 2007) is as legitimate and necessary as
considering financial and managerial information users in the development of
conventional accounting (CICA 2009). This is why the global objective of this
dissertation is to understand the role of stakeholders in environmental accounting. It
answers the call for more research on stakeholder involvement in external sustainability
reporting (Tilt 2007) and extends the topic to include involvement in internal accounting
matters.
Two important issues related to the objective must be highlighted. First, because of their
multifaceted nature, environmental issues are more complicated to tackle as a unified
whole. Second, 'stakeholders' is a broad umbrella term for many different parties that
have different interests and pursue different objectives (Freeman 1984; Donaldson and
Preston 1995). These issues make the achievement of the global dissertation objective an
ambitious and complex task that I judged would be best undertaken by breaking down the
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global objective into narrower sub-objectives. As a result, I decided to investigate the role
of stakeholders in environmental accounting from three angles:
1) The impact of stakeholder-motivated environmental governance on environmental
capital expenditures (ECE);
2) The influence of stakeholders on the selection of internal environmental
performance indicators (EPI);
3) The informational dynamics taking place between a firm and its stakeholders with
respect to environmental management.
The investigation of these issues led me to employ three conceptual frameworks and two
methodologies. These various research approaches constitute another means to handle the
complexity of the global dissertation objective.
Figure 7 depicts the relationships investigated in the dissertation. Social accounting is the
process an organizational entity uses to provide an account to a recipient (Gray et al.
1997). To do so, the organization uses a multiplicity of interrelated accounting systems,
three of which are the focus of the dissertation: capital budgeting, performance
measurement and external reporting (Epstein 1996). Corporate governance oversees
these three systems (Epstein and Birchard 2000), but the dissertation concentrates on its
role vis-à-vis the first system (this is why governance is linked to capital budgeting by a
full line and to the other two systems by dotted lines). Multiple stakeholder groups
surround the organization (Freeman 1984). For the sake of clarity, only the stakeholder
groups investigated in the dissertation are represented in the figure, although other groups
may exist. The stakeholders examined interact with the organization in such a way that,
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to diverse degrees, they are both influenced by the organization and influence the
organizational systems (depicted by the lines relating them to the corporation) (Clarkson
1995; Donaldson and Preston 1995). The stakeholders' influence on the three selected
environmental accounting systems is the focal point of the dissertation. It is studied in
light of stakeholder, legitimacy and ethical perspectives (depicted by the three colors
surrounding the corporation in the figure).
I chose to study the capital budgeting process of environmental investment in the first
essay to directly examine a financial environmental decision that also bears strategic and
regulatory importance (Buysse and Verbeke 2003; Clarkson et al. 2004; Johnston 2005).
ECE are studied in light of environmental governance to give predominance to directors'
impact on environmental issues (e.g. Kassinis and Vafeas 2002). Stakeholders are
considered through the examination of the theoretical motivation underlying
environmental governance (Brennan and Solomon 2008; Collier 2008). Results provide
support for the stakeholder- and ethics-based argument that better environmentally
governed corporations invest more in environmental capital expenditures.
Complementary analyses show that the influence of environmental governance is broader






















The analysis of internal EPI accomplished in the second essay is envisioned as a means to
study performance measures that are specific, strategic, numerous and that support
decision-making and performance evaluation (Chenhall 2003; Kaplan and Norton 2004;
Henri and Journeault 2009). The stakeholders' influence on EPI is investigated through
the perceptions managers mentioned in their interviews. Findings suggest that
stakeholders influence the choice of internal EPI in four ways, which are aggregated in a
continuum ranging from narrow indirect influence to broad bidirectional influence that
encompasses benchmarking. The firm's environmental impacts on specific stakeholders
and its needs for legitimization are conceptualized as drivers of the continuum.
Finally, I decided to contrast corporate environmental disclosure with stakeholder-
released environmental information to obtain a fuller portrayal of environmental
performance (Adams 2004; Dey 2007). In this third essay, stakeholders are directly
examined, their disclosure is studied as a part of the informational dynamics of
environmental management. Results suggest the existence of a gap between corporate
and stakeholder environmental disclosures. This gap is composed of different patterns
ranging from uniformity (the absence of a gap) in disclosures to performance-neutral and
performance-biased gaps. Ethical relativism, underlining the differences between the
environmental values of the case firm and those of its stakeholders, explains the nuances
in the reporting gap by advocating that different environmental values are met with
different environmental disclosures (Wong 1993; Lewis and Unerman 1999).
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Several aspects of the dissertation are summarized in Table 14. Overall, the dissertation
examines three interrelated environmental accounting issues. The specific research
questions led to the selection of three conceptual frameworks and two methodologies. A
different stakeholder standpoint was adopted for each essay. Combining theories (Gray
et al. 1995) and methodologies (Cooper and Morgan 2008) enriches our understanding of
a phenomenon. As Parker (2005: 849) summarized, "pluralism in theoretical lenses and
methodologies applied to common research problems can yield incremental and
accumulating insights that are enriched by both commonality and difference." The
various facets of the dissertation are an important catalyst in the fulfilment of the global
dissertation objective because the nuances they provide deepen our understanding of
firm-stakeholder interaction with respect- to environmental accounting. Combining the
results of the three essays lead to the conclusion that stakeholders influence
environmental accounting, but the form and extent of their influence vary depending on
the nature of the stakeholder group and the environmental issue at stake, with some
influences being more successful than others. The influences stakeholders have on firms,
together with their nuances, are explained by stakeholder accountability, organizational
legitimacy and ethical relativism.
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As a whole, the dissertation contributes to the literature in different ways. First,
environmental performance is complex to measure and assess owing to its multifaceted
nature (Ilinitch et al. 1998). Because it explores different aspects related to environmental
performance, the dissertation helps show how corporations shape their overall
environmental performance. Environmental investments, environmental performance
measurement and external reporting are all important elements in the construction of an
environmental performance approach (Clarkson et al. 2004; Henri and Journeault 2009;
Clarkson et al. 2008). Second, the dissertation contributes to accounting research by
studying issues that are still under-researched, although they have received significant
attention from practitioners (Conference Board of Canada 2008, GRI 2006). Indeed,
environmental governance mechanisms, internal EPI and the informational dynamics of
environmental reporting are three themes that are just beginning to emerge in the
literature (e.g. Berrone and Gomez-Mejia 2009; Henri and Journeault 2009;
Georgakopoulos and Thomson 2008). As such, the dissertation broadens the governance
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literature by examining environmental performance oversight at the board level.
Similarly, it widens the scope of management accounting research by focusing on a non-
financial (environmental) performance measurement issue. Likewise, it opens new
research areas in the voluntary reporting literature by taking into account the dynamics
corporations are involved in for purposes of environmental disclosure. Finally, the
dissertation contributes to knowledge on stakeholders' role in and impact on business
management (Donaldson and Preston 1995; Mitchell et al. 1997). Specifically, it
improves our understanding of stakeholder-firm interaction with respect to environmental
accounting issues. Most research until now aimed at demonstrating the existence of
stakeholder influence over social and environmental issues (e.g. Roberts 1992; Cormier
et al. 2004; Kassinis and Vafeas 2006). The processes and approaches adopted by
stakeholders to exert their influence were not usually given sufficient attention (Tilt
2007). The dissertation aims to be a significant step in tackling this issue, as it highlights
the different forms and levels of stakeholder influence on different environmental issues.
These in turn can be used as a means to pressure organizations towards greater
accountability and/or sustainability.
In this respect, the dissertation has implications for regulators, boards and managers as
well as stakeholders. The environmental accounting issues studied in the dissertation are
mostly voluntary in nature.29 As such, the findings will be of interest to regulators and
standard setters searching for the best way to shape policies and regulations for greater
environmental protection in terms of investments, measurement and reporting (e.g.
29Some environmental performance indicators and environmental capital expenditures are required by
regulation and hence are mandatory.
149
McFarland 2008). In addition, stakeholder engagement and dialogue is attracting
increasing attention and is thought to be an important element of sustainability (Network
on Business Sustainability 2009). Because the dissertation sheds light on stakeholders'
influence on some environmental decisions, the findings will be helpful for boards and
managers aiming to better understand the social ties of their corporation to preserve its
legitimacy or to improve its environmental performance. The findings will also be
important for stakeholders themselves, because they can employ the results to identify
situations in which they succeed or fail in their attempt to affect corporations and thus
adapt their approach consequently.
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Conclusion
The purpose of the dissertation is to study stakeholders' role in environmental
accounting. The first essay focuses on resource allocation and specifically examines the
role of corporate governance in the intensity of environmental capital expenditures.
Results from statistical analyses of 197 firm-year observations from environmentally
sensitive industries show that governance mechanisms dedicated to stakeholder
accountability and environmental protection increase the intensity of environmental
investments. The second essay concentrates on environmental performance measurement
by investigating the selection of internal performance indicators, specifically the role
stakeholders play in the management of these performance measures. The case study of a
multinational corporation in the natural resources sector suggests that stakeholder
influences on internal environmental performance metrics are organized along a
continuum ranging from narrow unidirectional influence to broad interactive influence
necessitating environmental benchmarking. The third essay shifts attention to voluntary
environmental reporting by contrasting corporate and stakeholder environmental
disclosures in a three-year single case study. Results from the analysis of the
informational dynamics of environmental management suggest that different patterns
arise between the perspectives, ranging from uniformity to performance-neutral and
performance-biased gaps between the case firm's and stakeholders' disclosures. As a
whole, the dissertation enhances the knowledge of firm-stakeholder interactions related to
environmental accounting by presenting a nuanced portrayal of stakeholder influences.
This dissertation contributes to three important streams of accounting research, namely
budgeting, strategic performance measurement systems and voluntary disclosure. The
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first essay adds to the knowledge on budgeting through its analysis of governance factors
driving the intensity of capital resource allocation related to the environment. Similarly,
the second essay studies the functioning of an environmental performance measurement
system, thereby extending the literature on strategic performance measurement systems.
By focusing on voluntary environmental disclosure, the third essay develops the broad
stream of accounting research that analyzes various kinds of voluntary disclosure.
Limitations need to be acknowledged for the dissertation. Limitations specific to each
essay are identified in their respective chapter; I will thus specify the limitations affecting
the dissertation in its entirety. First, breaking down the global objective of the
dissertation into three essays implies that some issues were deliberately left out of the
analysis in order to concentrate on aspects relevant to the essays. Second, throughout the
research process, the role of stakeholders was sometimes examined indirectly (see Table
14). Although studying influences indirectly adds another level of analysis to the
dissertation, the channel through which it was examined needs to be kept in mind in the
interpretation and usage of the results. Similarly, other methodological decisions made in
the production of this dissertation constrain the generalizability of the results. In fact,
these limitations point towards future research opportunities, to which I now turn.
An examination of Figure 7 (see Chapter 4) suggests many fruitful areas for future
research. Given the influence of corporate governance on capital budgeting, it would be
interesting to study whether environmental governance mechanisms also affect
performance measurement and external reporting. The domain of environmental
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governance is still emerging, and investigating these research questions would contribute
to the development of the field. It would also be relevant to study the stakeholders' role
in other environmental accounting systems, such as internal auditing and performance
evaluation. Stakeholder influence on investment decisions and performance indicators
found in the first two essays suggest that stakeholders might impact other internal
organizational systems with their environmental concerns. Finally, the relationships
between capital budgeting, performance measurement and external reporting, together
with stakeholders' influence over their interaction, are also worthy of investigation. This
analysis would consider the organization as a whole instead of as a combination of
multiple elements, and would enrich our understanding of environmental accounting by
jointly exploring managerial and financial accounting issues. Investigating these research
opportunities would follow up the work accomplished in this dissertation, which shed
light on multiple forms and levels of stakeholder influence on environmental accounting.
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Appendices
Appendix 1: KLD environmental rating criteria
Strengths















Appendix 2: Regulation Acts covered by the CEPD database
• Atomic Energy Act
• Clean Air Act
• Clean Water Act
• Endangered Species Act
• Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act
• Mining Safety and Health Act
• Safe Drinking Water Act
• Toxic Substances Control Act
The CEPD also provides information on the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
(RCRA). This information was left out of the variables environmental violations and
environmentalfines following the recommendations of the database builders. Indeed, the
Risk Metrics Group mentions that: "[The RCRA] programs requires a company to assess,
and if necessary clean up, contamination at active industrial sites as a condition of
retaining its RCRA permit to treat, store or dispose of hazardous waste (...). Because it
largely represents an obligation to clean up sites that were contaminated at some past date
when waste disposal standards were less restrictive, however, waste cleanup
responsibility should not be interpreted as evidence that a company violated any
environmental law or that current management is not addressing environmental issues in
a responsible manner." (RMG 200 1 : 1 2).
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_____________________ agreed to be recorded.
This interview is part of a research project studying environmental performance
indicators and the dynamic surrounding the development and usage of these performance
metrics. Your experience and knowledge with environmental performance management
at Company X are extremely valuable for our research. In addition to internal
environmental performance indicators, the interview will cover Company X' s
environmental approach and stakeholders
For the interview to be pleasant, I strongly encourage you to let me know any issue you
may have with respect to the questions asked or with the interview itself. Do you have
any questions or comments before we start?
Part one: Manager's experience
The first questions relate to your role as a manager with environmental responsibilities at
Company X. These questions aim to deepen our understanding of your position within
the environmental management process.
1 . What were your responsibilities as (title of the interviewee) at Company X?
2. What were your main daily tasks with respect to theses responsibilities?
Part two: Environmental strategy
Before directly discussing internal environmental performance indicators, we are
interested in the approach your company employs to manage environmental issues. This
will help us position internal environmental performance indicators within your strategy
and as such this approach will be the focus of our next set of questions.
3. Globally, what is the approach of Company X with respect to environmental
management?
4. I now would like to detail this environmental approach with you. How does this
approach is translated into
a. Strategic planning?
b. Development of production processes?
c. Management systems?
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Part three: Internal environmental performance indicators
The next set of questions gets into the core of our research and tackles internal measures
of environmental performance.
When I examined your corporate documents, I noted the use of different categories of




5. In addition to the type of manufacturing activities, what motivates the usage of









6. In the same line of thought, how are developed the internal environmental
performance indicators that you monitor?
a. What sources of information influence this development?
7. Now, I would like you to think about an internal environmental performance indicator
that was recently added to the set ofmonitored indicators. What is this indicator?
a. What motivated the addition of this indicator to the set of indicators you
monitor?
b. What other factors could explain the withdrawal of an indicator from the
set of indicators you monitor?
8. Similarly, now I would like you to think about an internal environmental performance
indicator that was recently withdrawn from the set of monitored indicators. What is
this indicator?
a. What motivated the abandonment of this indicator?




In order to deepen our analysis of the dynamics surrounding internal environmental
performance measurement, we would like to better understand the potential role of
specific actors related to the organization. The next set of questions cover this theme.








- Community in general
We will now turn to these groups one at the time by the means of similar questions.
9. What is {(1) clients; (2) employees; (3) governments; (4) investors; (5) creditors; (6)
community in general; (7) industry/competitors} 's influence (if they do have an
influence) over
a. Company X's environmental approach?
b. The internal environmental performance indicators monitored?
10. [If necessary, given the response in #10] What do you think are the reasons behind
this influence?
Part Five: Conclusion
1 1 . This concludes the points I wanted to discuss with you. You collaboration has been
extremely valuable to our research. Would you like to add other points that would
help us better understand the dynamics surrounding the internal measures of
environmental performance?
12. Before we end the interview, do you allow me to contact you if I need to complete
some information you provided? Sincere thank you for you collaboration and your
time. I am extremely grateful.
13. Before I leave, would you please fill out this document? It is intended to collect some
of your demographic information.
14. End of the interview with .Time .
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Appendix 4: Coding scheme
Coding scheme from Cormier and Magnan (2003) and Aerts et al. (2008) extended to
consider aspects related to the forest and paper products industry. The categories added
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The information disclosed by each perspective
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